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Abstract 
Due to an increase in interactions between the police and persons with mental 
illness (PMI), police services have begun deploying specialized mental health responses to 
more adequately address these calls. One of these responses is a Crisis Intervention Team 
(CIT) that is comprised of officers who are specially trained on mental health; another is a 
co-response where an officer is paired with a mental health specialist. Currently, little is 
known about these responses within Canada, therefore, this thesis employs a mixed 
methodology in order to explore the use of these responses nationwide. The results indicate 
that most of the participating services have some form of specialized response, and that 
these responses experience many successes and challenges – the latter of which may 
prevent or limit any potential successes. Recommendations and a call for future research 
are made which may assist Canadian police services in mitigating these challenges. 
 
Keywords: Policing; Mental health; Person with mental illness (PMI); Co-response; 
Crisis Intervention Team (CIT)  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 In Canada, the most recent estimates suggest that there are approximately 6.7 
million individuals – or 19.8% of the entire population – living with mental illness, and by 
the year 2041, that estimate is expected to increase to approximately 8.9 million (Smetanin 
et al., 2011). In any given year, one in five Canadians experience a mental health or 
addiction problem, and by the time Canadians reach the age of 40, one in two have – or 
have had – a mental illness (Smetanin et al., 2011). Police interactions with people with 
mental illness (PMI) in Canada have been increasing (Durbin, Lin, & Zaslavska, 2010b) 
and may comprise a significant percentage of all calls for service (Crocker, Hartford, & 
Heslop, 2009). However, not all Canadian PMI will experience an interaction with police. 
Police contact statistics indicate that in a sample of 5 million police interactions in 2016, 
PMI comprised less than 1 million of these interactions – or 18.8% of the sample – (Boyce, 
Rotenberg, & Karam, 2015), suggesting that police predominantly come into contact with 
a select group of PMI. 
 Police contacts with this population are largely attributed to the significant lack of 
community-based mental health resources within the post-de-institutionalization era where 
certain PMI who may require psychiatric care or support are not receiving – or are unable 
to receive – the care or support they require, resulting in certain PMI to being more prone 
to police contact than others (Cotton, 2004; Cotton & Coleman, 2010; Forchuk, Jensen, 
Martin, Csiernik, & Atyeo, 2010; Lamb & Bachrach, 2001). An additional consequence of 
inadequate resources post-de-institutionalization has been the criminalization of PMI for a 
variety of reasons, including arrest to get treatment through the criminal justice system 
(Lamb, Weinberger, & DeCuir, 2002) and police culture beliefs which may encourage 
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citations for productivity expectations (Schulenberg, 2016), all of which contribute to PMI 
being more likely to be arrested than non-PMI (Boyce et al., 2015). 
 Historically, police contacts with this population were rare and reserved as a role 
for those in the mental health system pre-de-institutionalization (Ellis, 2014; Engel & 
Silver, 2001), thus officers have lacked the training and competence on how to 
appropriately address calls involving PMI (Bittner, 1967). Contemporarily, however, the 
police have become de-facto mental health professionals (Compton et al., 2014a) within 
the post-de-institutionalization era and as a result, mental health training standards and 
curriculums have been established to better prepare officers for PMI interactions (Cotton 
& Coleman, 2008; Coleman & Cotton, 2010a). Although, in Canada, mental health training 
for police officers varies in length and content from jurisdiction to jurisdiction where some 
services provide little-to-no training for their officers; whereas others may provide lengthy 
and comprehensive training (Coleman & Cotton, 2010a). 
 Moreover, in addition to mental health-specific training, police services – both 
domestically and internationally – have begun deploying specialized responses to mental 
health related calls (Butler, 2014). Research has suggested that the use of specialized 
responses has been able to achieve many successes, such as improved officer knowledge 
of mental illness (Compton et al., 2014a), stronger partnerships with community-based 
resources (Dupont, Cochran, & Pillsbury, 2007), less arrests (Scott, 2000), and more 
positive interactions for PMI (Kirst et al., 2014), among many others. As will be outlined 
within the following chapter, specialized responses can take many forms, the most common 
of which are the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) model and the co-response team model 
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(Butler, 2014)1. The former originates out of the United States and is comprised of officers 
who are specially trained on mental health (Dupont et al., 2007); whereas the latter is 
comprised of an officer who is paired with a mental health specialist and respond as a pair 
to mental health related calls at the request of first responding officers (Shapiro et al., 
2015). Unsurprisingly, however, due to the under researched state of Canadian policing 
(Huey, 2016), very little is known about Canadian officers’ interactions with PMI 
generally, as well as the use of specialized responses specifically, such as CITs and/or co-
response. Therefore, the focus and objective of this thesis is to provide a fuller 
understanding of the use of CITs and co-response within the Canadian context. 
In the chapter that follows, existing literature will be reviewed on police 
interactions with PMI, de-institutionalization, mental health legislation, criminalization, 
mental health training for Canadian officers, the use of CITs and co-response teams, and, 
finally, policing strategies employed within the context of police-PMI interactions. The 
research questions this thesis seeks to answer will be outlined at the end of this chapter as 
well. Chapter Three will outline the methodology used to gather data, as well as data 
analysis techniques. Chapter Four will present the findings; whereas Chapter Five will be 
comprised of a discussion concerning the limitations of this thesis and findings presented 
in the previous chapter, and concludes with recommendations to police services as well as 
a call for future research. 
 Before moving on to the next chapter, however, a specific operationalization of 
‘PMI’ must be outlined. As Coleman and Cotton (2014) argue, there are a plethora of 
                                                 
1 The terms ‘CIT’ or ‘co-response’ are used when discussing either of these responses 
specifically; whereas the terms ‘specialized response’ or ‘response’ are used when 
discussing responses generally 
CIT AND CO-RESPONSE IN CANADA 
 
4 
different terms used to describe PMI, and as suggested by the statistics above, not all PMI 
come into contact with the police. Therefore, to avoid grouping all PMI under the same 
umbrella, this thesis adopts an operationalization of ‘PMI’ from the work of Coleman & 
Cotton (2014). Their operationalization specifically refers to interactions where “… signs 
and symptoms of mental illness are readily apparent – as opposed to people who may have 
a history or past experience of mental illness but whose symptoms are not evident at the 
moment” (p. 325). However, it is important to note that operationalizations of PMI within 
the academic literature are not as clear cut as the one provided by Coleman & Cotton 
(2014). The work of these authors is only one of a few articles in this area of literature 
which contain a specific operationalization of PMI, as such, the context of ‘PMI’ in other 
literature is relatively unknown. Moreover, an additional note of caution is that this term 
and/or operationalization may be unfamiliar to police services as they may opt for different 
terminology or other indicators of what does or does not constitute a PMI call. 
Nevertheless, as Coleman & Cotton (2014) argue, this term is familiar to readers as it is 
the most commonly used term within the literature on this topic and has been selected to 
be used herein. Ultimately, with this specific operationalization, readers are aware that the 
focus of this thesis is interactions between specialized mental health responses and 
individuals who are specifically exhibiting mental health symptoms at the moment of their 
interactions.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of literature concerning police 
interactions with those who are mentally ill or in mental health crisis. Specifically, factors 
such as the de-institutionalization of persons with mental illness (PMI) and mental health 
legislation will be discussed to provide an understanding of potential causes for increased 
police-PMI interactions. Subsequently, the criminalization of the mental health population 
during police interactions, through factors such as increased arrests, the police culture, and 
increased use of force, will be discussed. The chapter will then shift focus to the policing 
institution in Canada to discuss mental health training provided to Canadian officers which 
varies in length and content from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Following this, efforts to 
improve police-PMI interactions, specifically the use of Crisis Intervention Teams (CITs) 
and co-response teams, will be presented and discussed and arguments will be put forth 
that very little is known about the use of these interventions in Canada. The literature 
review concludes by discussing police strategies to provide a contextual framework behind 
police approaches to PMI interactions, as well as identifying the research questions this 
thesis seeks to answer.  
De-institutionalization and Police-PMI Interactions 
As one of the first scholars to explore the issue of PMI interactions with police, 
Bittner (1967) assessed the extent of discretion that officers hold when interacting with this 
particular population. Specifically, Bittner (1967) argued that when officers arrive at a PMI 
in crisis, they undergo a process he coined as ‘psychiatric first aid’ which was used to 
determine the best course of action to address the crisis, even though most officers were 
improperly trained on mental health at the time. His work found that several factors may 
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ultimately affect how a crisis could be resolved, such as officer characteristics (e.g., 
personal biases), community factors (e.g., lack of mental health programs), and situational 
dynamics (e.g., violent subject)  (Watson, Swartz, Bohrman, Kriegel, & Draine, 2014). In 
addition, Bittner (1967) found that transfers of PMI to hospital was a significantly time-
consuming task for officers as admission into the facility took several hours, thus causing 
most mental health crises to be resolved informally (Watson et al., 2014). 
 Surprisingly, over five decades after the work of Bittner (1967), there has not been 
a significant amount of improvement with respect to PMI-officer interactions. Some police 
services provide little-to-no mental health training for their officers (Coleman & Cotton, 
2010a) and there is a lack of mental health services and mental health in-take at local 
hospitals (Compton, Broussard, Hankerson-Dyson, Krishan, & Stewart-Hutto, 2011a). 
Further, officer discretion may be significantly impeded due to a lack of mental health 
services as well as disjuncture between department policy and police culture beliefs on how 
to address PMI, consequently leading to the criminalization of this population 
(Schulenberg, 2016). Ultimately, the cause of PMI interactions with police and the 
subsequent criminalization of this population has widely been attributed by several scholars 
to the failed process of de-institutionalization (e.g., Lamb & Bachrach, 2001; Morabito 
2007). 
Prior to the 1920s, police interaction with PMI was a rare occurrence as most PMI 
were confined within institutions for the mentally ill (Engel & Silver, 2001). However, 
between 1950 and 1970 a de-institutionalization process occurred where institutions were 
permanently closed in an attempt to reintegrate all PMI back into society (Ellis, 2014; 
Morabito et al., 2012). This process included three components: the release of 
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institutionalized PMI, diversion of PMI to alternative non-institutionalized facilities, and 
the development of community-based services and programs to appropriately care for PMI 
(Lamb & Bachrach, 2001). However, government planning post-institutionalization has 
been inadequate resulting in a lack of facilities, programs, and services for PMI (Cotton & 
Coleman, 2010, p. 304). Consequently, de-institutionalization and the subsequent lack of 
programs and services have caused PMI to increasingly come into contact with police 
(Cotton, 2004; Forchuk et al., 2010). 
Police may come into contact with PMI for several different circumstances, such 
as social support, informal interactions, disturbances, and mental health crises (Coleman 
& Cotton, 2010b). However, crises encompass the greatest challenge for officers and can 
include various symptomatic behaviour such as repetitious questioning, emotional venting, 
invasion of personal space, disorientation, and scattered narratives (Iacobucci, 2014; 
Schulenberg, 2016). Crises can also range on a continuum from symptoms which are non-
threatening in nature, such as hallucinations, to aggression and violence which may 
threaten the safety and wellbeing of officers, bystanders, and the PMI themselves 
(Bonkiewicz, Green, Moyer, & Wright, 2014). Fortunately, violent crises occur very rarely 
(Coleman & Cotton, 2010b), however, due to the unpredictability and a falsely perceived 
dangerousness of PMI, police officers are typically faced with public pressure to act 
quickly during a mental health crisis even though there may be no real cause for immediate 
arrest or intervention (Cotton, 2004; Girard et al., 2014; Morabito et al., 2012; Schulenberg, 
2016; Tully & Smith, 2015; Watson et al., 2014; Lipson, Turner, & Kasper, 2010). As will 
be expanded upon below, such ‘no win’ situations, as labeled by Cotton (2004), may lead 
to PMI being more likely to be charged for minor nuisance offences than non-PMI in an 
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attempt to ‘resolve’ the situation (Schulenberg, 2016). Conversely, encounters with PMI 
may take a significant amount of time. Some studies have found that encounters with PMI 
may take approximately 20 minutes longer than with non-PMI (Schulenberg, 2016), while 
other studies have found that encounters may range anywhere from 30 minutes to two hours 
(Wells & Schafer, 2006). Encounters with PMI may also be extended far beyond the initial 
crisis location if transport to a hospital is required, which according to Compton et al. 
(2010), may take up to eight hours or longer in some circumstances.  
It is estimated that between 5% (Brink et al., 2011) and 15% of all police calls 
involve an interaction with a PMI, and PMI are two to three times more likely to have 
interactions with police than non-PMI (Cotton & Coleman, 2008). A study by Crocker et 
al. (2009) found that in a sample of 767,365 police interactions, PMI represented only 0.9% 
of the sample, but 6.2% of all police interactions. Similarly, the 2012 Community Health 
Survey conducted by Statistics Canada found that in a sample of 5 million Canadians who 
came into contact with police, 18.8% were PMI (Boyce et al., 2015). In contrast, studies 
with smaller sample sizes yield similar results which indicate consistent and increasing 
interactions. The small town of Belleville, Ontario has approximately four officer-PMI 
interactions per day (Coleman & Cotton, 2010b), whereas studies by Cotton (2004) and 
Wells and Schafer (2006) show that approximately 70% of all officers in their samples 
have at least one or more PMI interaction per month. Although little research has been 
conducted on the recent increase of interactions, some studies have already documented a 
steady increase. For example, an Ontario-based study found that in 2007, Ontario police 
services were having 7,000 more yearly interactions than they were just four years earlier 
(Durbin et al., 2010b). Also, with estimates suggesting that the Canadian PMI population 
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is to surpass 9 million by the year 2041, police interactions with PMI are undoubtedly 
expected to increase simultaneously. 
Since de-institutionalization and the subsequent increase in PMI contacts, police 
officers have been labeled as ‘psychiatrists in blue’ (Menzies, 1987), ‘street-corner 
psychiatrists’ (Iacobucci, 2014), and ‘de-facto mental health professionals’ (Compton et 
al., 2014a) for assuming the mental health role traditionally held by nurses and social 
workers (Ellis, 2014). Police have had to fulfill those labels ‘by default’ to the point where 
it has become a “regular part of an officer’s job” (Iacobucci, 2014, pp. 78 & 96). Many 
officers have accepted their role as de-facto mental health professionals (Girard et al., 2014; 
Watson, Corrigan, & Ottati, 2004), and some even volunteer to receive more training 
(Compton et al., 2011a). However, there remains a belief within policing that interactions 
with PMI have ‘nothing to do with police work’ or are ‘not real police work’ (Coleman & 
Cotton, 2010b; Schulenberg, 2016). Much of this belief has been attributed to the failures 
of de-institutionalization. For example, Boyd & Kerr (2016) analyzed several reports from 
the Vancouver Police on mental health and argued that the reports blamed the ‘failing 
mental health system’ and reluctance to institutionalize PMI for increased interactions, 
which, to the Vancouver Police, were a financial burden on police resources. In addition, 
Boyd and Kerr (2016) further argued that these reports attempted to spread a moral panic 
against PMI by sharing ‘worst case’ officer-PMI interactions in an attempt to link mental 
health and violence, and claiming that ‘half’ of all Vancouver Police shootings since 1980 
involved PMI without specifying an exact number (Boyd & Kerr, 2016). On the contrary, 
the amount of police shootings against PMI from 1980 to 2002 was estimated to be about 
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six, thus leading the authors to question the narrative of the Vancouver Police on how 
‘tragic’ and ‘violent’ PMI may be (Boyd & Kerr, 2016). 
 Alternatively, other scholars attribute the police ‘burden’ of interacting with PMI 
as a symptom of police culture. According to Schulenberg (2016), “police culture consists 
of values and attitudes held by officers, which is made visible through interaction and the 
direct or indirect pressures to conform to norms of behaviour” (p. 464). In most societies, 
there remains a deep-seated stigma associated with mental illness (Coleman & Cotton, 
2010a) consequently informing police attitudes, beliefs, and values (Iacobucci, 2014). 
However, Iacobucci (2014) argues that there are also many in-service influences which 
forge and maintain police culture beyond societal beliefs. These influences may include 
police leaders, such as the Chief of Police, deputy chiefs, and unit commanders who may 
all influence those lower on the chain of command, positive and negative reinforcements, 
the formal value structure (e.g., Mission and Vision Statements), and practices that may 
highlight the importance of certain actions over others, which in turn, may affect how 
officers interact with certain individuals or populations (Iacobucci, 2014).  
There may be various positive attitudes and beliefs within a police culture, such as 
the wellness of officers, accountability (e.g., body-worn cameras), and a strong focus on 
honourable and professional conduct with members of the public (Iacobucci, 2014). 
However, there may also be negative attitudes and beliefs as well. For example, some 
officers may believe that police shootings of people in crisis are ‘inevitable’ thus leading 
to a lack of effort to improve crisis encounters, officer safety takes priority over the safety 
of the subject, the duty to de-escalate is less important than other duties, and that policing 
is not social work therefore interactions with PMI are less important than other tasks 
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(Iacobucci, 2014). Nevertheless, even though the literature suggests that the police culture 
may have established negative attitudes and beliefs toward interactions with PMI, and there 
remains an understanding that police interactions with PMI is ‘not real police work’, the 
parens patriae doctrine dictates that police have the duty to assist PMI.   
Mental Health Legislation 
Parens patriae is Latin for ‘parent of his or her country’ and is a legal doctrine 
which allows the state to act as a guardian for those unable to take care of themselves, such 
as children or individuals with disabilities (Cornell Law, n.d.). This, in fact, is one of the 
two universal duties of the police institution: the protection, safety, and welfare of the 
public; and, the other, as mentioned, protecting members of the public who are unable to 
care for themselves, most notably, PMI who are in crisis (Bonkiewicz et al., 2014; Ellis, 
2014; Engel & Silver, 2001; Schulenberg, 2016; Lamb & Bachrach, 2001). 
Each respective Canadian province or territory is responsible for establishing the 
parens patriae duties for officers in their jurisdiction by means of the mental health 
legislation of that province or territory (Coleman & Cotton, 2010b). In the province of 
Ontario, for example, actions of police officers during interactions with PMI are regulated 
under section 17 of the Ontario Mental Health Act (1990). This section states that in 
instances where an individual is threatening, attempting, or has threatened bodily harm to 
themselves or others, has or is behaving violently, or has shown or is showing a lack of 
care for themselves, is appropriate grounds for an officer to apprehend the PMI for transfer 
to a hospital for assessment (Ontario Mental Health Act, 1990). In addition to section 17, 
there are two other sections which outline police duties with respect to PMI. Section 28 
provides officers with the authority to apprehend an individual who departed a psychiatric 
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facility without authorization; whereas Section 33 states that officers who transfer a PMI 
to the hospital for psychiatric assessment are to hold the PMI in custody until the facility 
has taken custody of the individual (Ontario Mental Health Act, 1990) – which as described 
below, may take several hours to occur. 
With each province or territory enacting their own mental health legislation, the 
possibility of discrepancies and differences between the different forms of legislation arise. 
These differences are particularly evident with respect to involuntary admission to a 
hospital or psychiatric facility. Gray, Hastings, Love, and O’Reilly (2016) highlight these 
differences by comparing the involuntary admission criteria between all 13 pieces of 
provincial and territorial mental health legislation using the hypothetical case of Victoria 
– a 25-year-old law student who experiences auditory hallucinations and paranoid 
delusions, consequently becoming homeless, but has refused to receive voluntary medical 
help. Specifically, Gray et al. (2016) assess whether Victoria does or does not meet the 
various criteria for involuntary admission, which are: suffering from a mental disorder, 
harm, mental/physical deterioration, the need for treatment, and the inability to make a 
treatment decision. Ultimately, the results are rather inconsistent. With respect to the 
conditions of suffering from a mental illness and harm, Victoria successfully meets these 
conditions under all mental health legislations. However, for mental or physical 
deterioration Victoria meets the criteria in only seven jurisdictions; for need of psychiatric 
treatment in six jurisdictions; and the inability to make a treatment decision in four 
jurisdictions (Gray et al., 2016). Thus, depending on where Victoria is in the country, she 
may or may not be involuntarily admitted to a hospital for psychiatric care. Consequently, 
these ‘strict set of requirements’ for involuntary admission are a significant contribution to 
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what is known as the ‘revolving door’ of the mental health system (Iacobucci, 2014, p. 84) 
and the subsequent criminalization of PMI. 
The Criminalization of PMI 
The criminalization of PMI has occurred as a consequence of de-institutionalization 
due to the overuse of the criminal justice system to resolve encounters with PMI, typically 
by means of arrest or citations for reasons which a non-PMI would normally not be 
apprehended for (Cotton, 2004; Engel & Silver, 2001; Schulenberg, 2016). There are a 
plethora of factors which have resulted in the criminalization of PMI, two of the more 
prominent reasons being institutional fragmentation and the ‘revolving door’. 
Both the police and the mental health system have come to the understanding that 
in order to address mental health crises, both institutions must collaborate in order to 
properly assist PMI in crisis (Cotton & Coleman, 2010; Iacobucci, 2014). However, in 
some instances, this collaboration does not have a coordinated nor comprehensive 
approach, but rather consists of a fragmented network of hospitals, community 
organizations, housing programs, and mental health practitioners who operate in their own 
silo (Iacobucci, 2014). Particularly of concern with fragmentation is the resulting 
disjuncture between the police and mental health cultures. These cultures differ in the sense 
that the police focus on the safety and security of the community as a whole, thus 
potentially causing a crisis to culminate in a manner which may not be adequate for PMI 
(i.e., arrest), but has ensured the immediate safety of the community; whereas mental health 
professionals want to ensure that the outcome of a crisis is safe and positive for the PMI 
(Coleman & Cotton, 2010a; Kirst et al., 2014). To put this into perspective, a mental health 
system stakeholder stated: 
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‘Cause I think we just have kind of two different viewpoints where the police have 
multiple calls that they go through every single day so their idea is get in, get out 
as quickly as possible, let’s resolve this situation right here so I can move onto the 
next call whereas we’re kind of thinking more holistically with the client like there 
is a lot of information that might not seem relevant to the police officer, but it’s 
relevant to us and how we might think of resources… (Kirst et al., 2014, p. 20) 
 
This disjuncture between police and mental health cultures has led to obvious calls by 
scholars for a tightly knit bridge between the two collaborating cultures to ensure future 
success (Kirst et al., 2014), however, irrespective of the need for culture bridging, there is 
a significant lack of mental health assistance, programs, and services available to PMI 
consequently resulting in PMI not receiving appropriate treatment. 
 One of the most prominent issues in the contemporary mental health system is the 
lack of psychiatric beds. Between 1985 and 1999, the average number of days in a 
Canadian psychiatric facility decreased by approximately 42% due to a lack of beds (Sealey 
& Whitehead, 2004). Further, in 2007, select police services in Ontario reported that they 
conducted approximately 16,000 apprehensions under the Ontario Mental Health Act 
(1990), however, there were only 4,364 psychiatrist beds available in the province at that 
time (Durbin, Lin, & Rush, 2010a), meaning that in several thousand instances where a 
PMI was transported to hospital by police, they were not admitted. Conversely, in instances 
when a PMI is successfully admitted to hospital, it is not uncommon for them to be released 
shortly afterwards and having another crisis interaction with police less than 24 hours later 
(Canada, Angell, & Watson, 2010). The lack of psychiatric beds has put pressure on 
doctors to discharge patients who may be considered as ‘borderline clients’ (Teplin, 1983) 
in an attempt to free up beds for individuals who may need more serious psychiatric care. 
Consequently, the revolving door of the mental health system has led police officers to 
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operate in what scholars have labeled as the ‘gray zone’ with respect to officer discretion 
and decision making when attempting to address a PMI crisis. 
 When interacting with the public, police have a considerable amount of discretion 
thus allowing them to be perceived as the ‘gatekeepers’ of the criminal justice system 
(Lamb & Bachrach, 2001; Compton et al., 2014a). During an interaction with PMI, while 
heavily dependent on the context of the interaction, officers may decide to issue a warning, 
divert the PMI into the mental health system, proceed with charges, or take no further 
action (Cotton & Coleman, 2010; Bonkiewicz et al., 2014). However, due to the revolving 
door, several scholars have found that police may be forced to conduct a ‘mercy booking’. 
Mercy bookings typically occur when a PMI is arrested for being a danger to themselves 
or others, but with a lack of psychiatric beds or community-based services, the PMI’s best 
option to receive psychiatric treatment would be through the criminal justice system 
(Butler, 2014; Compton et al., 2014a; Lamb & Bachrach, 2001; Lamb et al., 2002; 
Schulenberg, 2016; Teplin, 1983; Teplin, 1984).  
Alternatively, arresting PMI may also be the easiest conclusion for officers as 
opposed to transferring a PMI to hospital or other mental health service. Several studies 
have found that officers may spend several hours of their shift at a hospital waiting for the 
medical staff to take custody of the PMI (Wells & Schafer, 2006). One study found that on 
average, officers spend approximately 5.27 hours ‘babysitting’ PMI at the hospital which 
may take officers away from what they may consider ‘real police work’ (Schulenberg, 
2016). Arrests to avoid lengthy hospital visits may also be further exacerbated by the police 
culture. Specifically, Schulenberg (2016) found that a disjuncture between department 
policy and police culture impacted the ability of officers to address PMI interactions 
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appropriately as department policy encourages police to address interactions through 
diversion to the mental health system, but the police culture pressures officers to resolve 
PMI encounters rapidly and informally with an added encouragement of charges and 
citations to achieve productivity expectations. 
 Consequently, a lack of programs and facilities, exacerbated by a lack of police 
discretion and pressures of the police culture, may cause PMI to be increasingly 
criminalized and re-institutionalized within the criminal justice system (Wood & Watson, 
2017). The 2012 Canadian Community Health Survey on Mental Health found that 
Canadian PMI are four times more likely to be arrested (12.5%) than non-PMI (2.8%) 
(Boyce et al., 2015). Other empirical analyses also support these findings (Crocker et al., 
2009; Fisher et al., 2006; Hartford, Heslop, Stitt, & Hock, 2005; Schulenberg, 2016). PMI 
are overwhelmingly arrested for nuisance or order-related crimes which tend to draw a 
significant amount of attention from bystanders, thus forcing police to respond even though 
there may not be an immediate need to (Boyd & Kerr, 2016; Reuland, Schwarzfeld, & 
Draper, 2009; Schulenberg, 2016; Wells & Schafer, 2006; Watson, Angell, Morabito, & 
Robinson, 2008a). Once arrested, PMI are upwards of twice as likely to have re-
involvement with police than the general population (Crocker et al., 2009; Fisher et al., 
2006; Hartford et al., 2005), 50% of whom may have an interaction occur within a two-
month period after their arrest (Hartford et al., 2005). Some PMI may even have a 
significant amount of interactions. For example, in an analysis of 13,816 PMI-police 
encounters over a ten-year period, Fisher et al. (2006) found that the number of encounters 
for PMI in the sample ranged from two to 71 encounters. However, some scholars, such as 
Engel & Silver (2001), refute the criminalization of PMI by arguing that simply because 
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PMI are disproportionally arrested, does not mean their arrests are not justified. While it is 
true allegations of serious offenses limits officer discretion (Lamb & Bachrach, 2001) and 
PMI are more likely to display ‘arrest generating behaviour’ (Butler, 2014) such as being 
disrespectful, uncooperative, or under the influence of drugs or alcohol (Schulenberg, 
2016), the aforementioned studies overwhelmingly find that arrest is a common resolution 
for PMI interactions. 
 Another prevalent issue in the criminalization of PMI is use of force. Use of force 
in interactions with both PMI and non-PMI is relatively rare as it occurs in less than 1% of 
all interactions (Morabito et al., 2012; Brink et al., 2011). Nevertheless, studies have 
concluded that PMI are more likely to have force used against them than non-PMI, 
especially PMI who may have comorbid disorders (Morabito, Socia, Wilk, & Fisher, 2017). 
Some scholars argue that there are four contexts which foster physical confrontations 
between PMI and police: (1) fear from PMI for being in an unfamiliar situation, police 
uniform, and/or overpowering attitude; (2) PMI reluctance to comply/cooperate; (3) lack 
of understanding or empathy from officers; and (4) perceptions that PMI may be 
unpredictable and dangerous (Ruiz & Miller, 2004). Over half of the PMI in a study 
conducted by Livingston et al. (2014b) reported being handcuffed or physically restrained 
by officers; select PMI also reported being pushed, punched, kicked, or had a weapon used 
against them (e.g., baton, Taser, firearm) (Livingston et al., 2014b). Consequently, studies 
conducted on aggressive use of force during police stops of non-PMI have found that 
individuals who have endured police force have developed heightened anxieties and trauma 
as a result (Geller, Fagan, Tyler, & Link, 2014). Such anxieties and trauma may be 
particularly heightened for PMI who may find future police encounters even more difficult, 
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especially with the increasingly militaristic appearance of contemporary policing 
(Coleman & Cotton, 2010b).  
Moreover, in some extremely rare instances, interactions can end in the shooting 
death of the PMI (Coleman & Cotton, 2010b; Morabito et al., 2017). Between 1992 and 
2002, there were 11 shooting deaths of PMI in the whole of Canada (as cited in Coleman 
& Cotton, 2010b), six PMI in Vancouver from 1980 to 2002 (Boyd & Kerr, 2016), and five 
between 2002 and 2012 in Toronto (Iacobucci, 2014). PMI shootings in the United States 
are far more common. The United States does not collect data on police-initiated shootings, 
therefore, news outlets such as The Guardian (n.d.) and The Washington Post (n.d.) have 
established their own respective databases in an attempt to track these shootings. The data 
indicates that every year since the creation of the databases in 2015, individuals who have 
exhibited signs of mental illness have accounted for approximately one-fourth to one-third 
of all police shootings – 324 PMI in 2015, 241 in 2016, 236 in 2017, and as of March 1, 
2018, 25 in 2018 (The Washington Post, n.d.). 
 Although PMI may disproportionally endure unnecessary arrest, force, or even 
death, most participants of qualitative studies by Brink et al. (2011), Desmarais et al. 
(2014), Livingston et al. (2014b), and Watson et al. (2008a) rated their experiences as fairly 
positive. One PMI stated, “sometimes cops are kind and helpful; other ones can be cocky 
and overly aggressive, but, I guess, overall, it’s a healthy balance” (Brink et al., 2011, p. 
44). Another stated “… normally they rough me up, you know, they have cuffs on too tight. 
They talk to me like very degrading, but this officer was very kind… Like I said, he treated 
me with respect, not a thief (Watson et al., 2008a, p. 453). In many instances, when a PMI 
had a negative contact with police, they tended to target the individual officer as the source 
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of the negative contact, as opposed to the entire police institution as a whole (Brink et al., 
2011). However, overwhelmingly, the PMI in these studies suggested that officers need 
more training with respect to mental illness. A PMI spoke to this by saying, 
Police need more training of dealing with mental illness. I think many police 
officers do not know the signs and symptoms of mental illness and mistake them 
for being drunk or high or choosing to be violent. I think with most people with 
mental illness, fear is often the reason for symptoms. When someone is afraid, then 
the wrong thing to do is apply force, which happens (Brink et al., 2011, p. 76) 
 
More specifically, PMI believe that officers should be more adequately trained in the areas 
of understanding mental illness and its effects, effective communication, compassion, and 
prioritizing non-violent responses (Livingston et al., 2014b). In addition, PMI also stressed 
the need for police to connect with the community, recognize and reward positive police 
practice, improve how police officers are selected for employment, recognize the role of 
peer influence in policing (i.e., police culture), increase accountability, and finally, involve 
mental health professionals during mental health interactions (Livingston et al., 2014b). In 
Canada, however, the mental health training of police officers is, at times, limited, 
ambiguous, and differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
Police Mental Health Training in Canada 
 When new officers are hired in Canada, they are required to attend one of 13 police 
colleges for basic training and education (Cotton & Coleman, 2008).  These colleges can 
be national (e.g., RCMP), provincial (e.g., Ontario Police College, Atlantic Police 
Academy, Saskatchewan Police College, Justice Institute of British Columbia), or under 
the control of a particular police service (e.g., Royal Newfoundland Constabulary, Halifax, 
Winnipeg, Brandon, Calgary, Lethbridge, Edmonton). In a survey of Canadian police 
academies, Cotton & Coleman (2008) found that all new police recruits receive at least 
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some form of mental health training, and that training at these academies is conducted in 
one of two ways: an entire curriculum specifically focused on mental health; or mental 
health training that is combined with other forms of training, such as use of force, tactical 
communication, firearms, and/or officer safety. In addition, the length of training varied 
significantly between jurisdictions, ranging from one to 20 hours. Specifically, programs 
which provided five hours or less included Lethbridge (1 hour), Brandon (3 hours), RCMP 
(4 hours), and the Justice Institute of British Columbia (5 hours); the Ontario Police College 
and Calgary provide seven and seven-and-a-half hours, respectively; the Royal 
Newfoundland Constabulary, Halifax, Winnipeg, and Saskatchewan provide between ten 
and 20 hours of training; and finally, Edmonton and the Atlantic Police Academy provide 
over 20 hours of training. The training modules may include a combination of topics such 
as stigma, signs/symptoms, understanding major psychiatric disorders (e.g., 
schizophrenia), communication strategies, dangerousness/aggression, hallucinations, 
suicide intervention, Mental Health Act apprehensions, alternatives to use of force, among 
many others. However, due to the varying length of training at these academies, the topics 
covered vary significantly from college to college, thus certain emphasis may be placed on 
particular topics causing other, potentially important, topics to be neglected (Cotton & 
Coleman, 2008). 
 After police college, officers may receive further in-service mental health training 
that may be tailored towards the population they will serve within their jurisdiction 
(Coleman & Cotton, 2010a). Coleman and Cotton (2010a) conducted a second study in an 
attempt to gather more knowledge with respect to the in-service training. Approximately 
500 Canadian police services, police colleges, and mental health agencies were contacted 
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with respect to in-service officer training – the authors only received 26 responses 
(Coleman & Cotton, 2010a). Nevertheless, the provided responses appear to be relatively 
similar to the responses of the police colleges found in Cotton and Coleman (2008) – 
mental health training modules differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction due to restrained 
training times, which range from one to 40 hours (Coleman & Cotton, 2010a). Specifically, 
Coleman and Cotton (2010a) found that many remote services, particularly remote units of 
the RCMP, overwhelmingly rely on online training for their officers; while other remote 
services (e.g., Royal Newfoundland Constabulary) rely on training materials which were 
not specifically designed for police training, such as Mental Health First Aid from the 
Mental Health Commission of Canada. Larger services tend to have dedicated mental 
health training modules which may contain a combination of traditional classroom 
instruction, online learning components, and field experience with a mental health 
professional that is supplemented with extensive written materials (e.g., Calgary Police, 
Halifax Regional Police, Ontario Police College). Contrastingly, some jurisdictions do not 
conduct regular training for their officers, such as in the case of the Saskatchewan Police 
College which indicated that in-service mental health training is only available to new 
officers and soon-to-be supervisors. While other services, such as the Delta Police in 
British Columbia, may “provide employees with the education and training to perform 
apprehension under Sec 28 (1) of the Mental Health Act” (Coleman & Cotton, 2010a, p. 
21) as opposed to other training, such as tactical communication or de-escalation, which 
typically emphasize that apprehension is a last resort. 
The topics covered during in-service mental health training are similar to that of the 
police colleges, which may include a combination of stigma, suicide intervention, 
CIT AND CO-RESPONSE IN CANADA 
 
22 
diagnoses/symptoms, the Mental Health Act, crisis intervention training, among many 
others (Coleman & Cotton, 2010a). Ultimately, the overall goal with mental health training 
is to provide officers with the skills to successfully de-escalate a crisis situation without 
increasing the chance of police liability or injury to any parties involved (Oliva, Morgan, 
& Compton, 2010). Unfortunately, there are a variety of factors which may affect the 
design and effectiveness of in-service training.  
The primary issue is that there is a lack of comprehensive and widespread research 
conducted on mental health training and education for police officers (Coleman & Cotton, 
2010a). Watson, Angell, Vidalon, and Davies (2010) argue that this is due to all police 
services collecting and retaining different information – which for the most part is not 
adequate data for an accurate evaluation – thus leading to several methodological 
shortcomings when evaluations are attempted (e.g., small sample size, different 
operationalisations based on available data, etc.) and limited generalizability (Coleman & 
Cotton, 2010a). Other factors affecting training effectiveness include police discretion, 
behaviour and attitudes of officers, stigma, and use of force (Coleman & Cotton, 2014) – 
all indicative of the aforementioned topics of criminalization and the police culture. 
Various stakeholders interviewed by Iacobucci (2014) indicated that “culture eats training” 
(p. 117). Thus, in an attempt to combat the attitudes and behaviour of the police culture, 
Cotton and Coleman (2006) argue that “each police organization should foster a culture in 
which mental illness is viewed as a medical disability not a moral failure, and in which 
PMI are treated with the same degree of respect as other members of society” (p. 4). 
Coleman and Cotton (2010a) as well as Iacobucci (2014) further argue that this form of 
culture can be achieved by establishing a revised set of language, policies, and procedures 
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which emphasizes that interactions with PMI are indeed ‘real police work’. Specifically, 
Iacobucci (2014) states that services should construct a formal statement which establishes 
the services’ commitment to assisting people in crisis. Such a statement should be treated 
equal to the core values of the service and should include commitments that preserve the 
lives of PMI, emphasize de-escalation, eliminate stereotypes and stigma, enhance co-
operation with the mental health system, and propose continuous self-improvement of the 
service and its officers (Iacobucci, 2014). 
 A positive culture can also be fostered by advanced forms of mental health training. 
Coleman and Cotton’s (2010a) in-service training survey found that some police services 
had an advanced training matrix which suggest that different officers at a service may 
receive different forms of training based on where they are located in the matrix. For 
example, the Halifax Regional Police training matrix (Appendix 1) has four different levels 
of mental health training (Coleman & Cotton, 2010a), and resembles the later published 
Training and Education About Mental Illness for Police Organizations (TEMPO) model 
by Coleman and Cotton (2014) which emphasizes a tiered training program. Levels one 
and two concern basic training for new officers and in-service training for current officers, 
respectively. However, levels three and four include CIT and co-response (Coleman & 
Cotton, 2010a) – advanced forms of mental health training with an objective to improve 
officer communication and de-escalation skills while simultaneously improving 
interactions with PMI and co-operation with the mental health system.    
Improving Crisis Intervention 
 The work of Munetz and Griffin (2006) highlights the use of the Sequential 
Intercept Model as an approach to decriminalize PMI. The model (Appendix 2) is viewed 
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as a series of ‘filters’ where a PMI can be diverted away from the criminal justice system 
and into the appropriate psychiatric care. The first filter, or the “ultimate intercept” as 
posited by Munetz and Griffin (2006, p. 545), is an accessible mental health system. They 
argue that “an accessible, comprehensive, effective mental health treatment system focused 
on the needs of individuals with serious and persistent mental disorders is undoubtedly the 
most effective means of preventing the criminalization of people with mental illness” 
(Munetz & Griffin, 2006, p. 545). However, as reviewed above, the current state of the 
mental health system, particularly in Canada, is not accessible, comprehensive, nor 
effective, consequently leading to a continuous increase in PMI interactions with police 
and subsequent criminalization. Thus, the second intercept in the model concerns the use 
of pre-arrest diversion programs utilized by emergency services and law enforcement 
(Munetz & Griffin, 2006). 
 Efforts to employ pre-arrest diversion programs for PMI interactions have been 
undertaken globally (Butler, 2014) especially as findings indicate that the use of mental 
health services are associated with reduced re-arrest (Constantine, Robst, Andel, & Teague, 
2012). These programs may be employed in a variety of different forms and structures 
depending on the need of the particular jurisdiction (Butler, 2014; Deane, Steadman, 
Borum, Veysey, & Morrissey, 1999; Durbin et al., 2010a), however, most commonly, these 
programs can take one of three forms: 
1. A mental health-based response which commonly encompasses mobile crisis 
teams that are a part of the local mental health system, but can also be requested 
to respond to a crisis at the discretion of first-responding officers; 
2. A police-based specialized mental health response, otherwise known as the 
‘co-responding model’, where a police officer and mental health practitioner 
work collaboratively and co-respond to mental health crises at the discretion of 
first-responding officers; and; 
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3. A police-based specialized police response, such as the ‘Memphis Model’ or 
Crisis Intervention Team (CIT), which includes specially trained mental health 
officers who attend and de-escalate mental health crises (Deane et al., 1999, p. 
100) 
 
Such programs have the ability to reduce the risk of police and/or PMI injury, improve 
officer awareness and collaboration among various mental health institutions, reduce 
arrests and recidivism, and can be the ‘log in the fire’ which has the ability to initiate 
positive change with respect to officer attitudes, beliefs, stigma, and the police culture 
(Watson, Ottati, Draine, & Morabito, 2011; Ellis, 2014; Reuland et al., 2009; Butler, 2014; 
Constantine et al., 2012).  
Crisis Intervention Teams (CIT)  
Subsequent to a Memphis police officer shooting a PMI in 1987, the Memphis 
police department formed a multi-party, co-operative partnership with the Alliance for the 
Mentally Ill, the University of Memphis, and the University of Tennessee in an attempt to 
develop a specialized unit within the police department which could have a greater focus 
on interactions with PMI (Steadman, Deane, Borum, & Morrissey, 2000). From this 
partnership, the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) was formed which seeks to improve police 
training and emphasizes the need for co-operative and collaborative partnerships between 
the police, the mental health system, and various community-based mental health programs 
and services to improve the quality of life for PMI and to reverse the re-institutionalization 
of PMI in the criminal justice system (Wells & Schafer, 2006; Bonfine et al., 2014; Wood 
& Watson, 2017). CIT has quickly spread throughout the United States (Dupont et al., 
2007) and across the world with most recent estimates suggesting that there are over 3,000 
CIT programs being employed internationally (as cited in Watson & Fulambarker, 2012). 
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 One of the founders of the CIT model, Randolph Dupont, and colleagues (2007), 
stress that there are several core elements that should be present within each CIT program 
that are “central to the success of the program’s goals” (p. 3). These elements include 
ongoing elements, operational elements, and sustaining elements. 
 The ongoing elements of CIT emphasize the need for continuous and unobstructed 
co-operation, collaboration, and leadership between and within the law enforcement 
community (e.g., police department, corrections, judiciary, and policy development 
personnel), the advocacy community (e.g., PMI, family members of PMI, and advocacy 
groups), and the mental health community (e.g., mental health professionals, non-
profit/private agencies, institutions, universities, and trainers) (Dupont et al., 2007). In 
addition to community co-operation, communities with CITs are encouraged to develop a 
sense of ‘community ownership’ to ensure that all concerned individuals and organizations 
have a stake in the initial planning stages of CIT, the implementation, its training 
curriculum, and ongoing feedback to ensure its success. Furthermore, the ongoing elements 
also concern the creation of policies and procedures which direct the actions of law 
enforcement and mental health officials before, during, and subsequent to a mental health 
intervention by CIT. These policies and procedures include the need for approximately 20-
25% of a police service to be CIT trained in order to ensure adequate 24-hour coverage, 
and inter-agency agreements to ensure a wide range of inpatient and outpatient services are 
immediately available for PMI brought in by CIT (Dupont et al., 2007).    
 The operational elements emphasize that officers who wish to be on a CIT must 
voluntarily apply for a position. Officers will then subsequently be put through a selection 
process based on recommendations, the officer’s disciplinary file, and an interview 
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(Dupont et al., 2007). Once successfully selected, CIT officers maintain their role as patrol 
officers, but acquire new duties and skills through CIT training. The CIT curriculum 
(Appendix 3) is a 40-hour comprehensive course consisting of lectures on 15 different 
topics associated with mental health (e.g., alcohol and drug assessment, co-occurring 
disorders, suicide prevention, personality disorders, community resources, etc.), visits to 
mental health treatment facilities, as well as scenario-based exercises (e.g., verbal skills, 
stages of crisis escalation, de-escalation). Police agencies with CITs are also encouraged 
to train their 911 dispatchers to ensure proper recognition of a crisis event, that appropriate 
questions are being asked of the caller, and that the CIT officers nearest to the crisis event 
are dispatched immediately. In addition, the operational elements also emphasize that a 
CIT have a designated emergency mental health receiving facility available with on 
demand access, no barriers to care, and minimal turnaround time for fast transfer of custody 
between CIT officers and the receiving facility (Dupont et al., 2007).  
 Finally, the sustaining elements of CIT include outreach to promote the 
development of the program regionally and nationally, the recognizing and honouring of 
CIT officers through awards, certificates of recognition, and banquets, and the continuous 
in-service training of CIT officers (Dupont et al., 2007). The sustaining elements also 
emphasize the need of continuous evaluation and research to measure the impact, 
outcomes, and efficacy of CIT.  
Outcome research with respect to CITs, although limited, has displayed very 
favourable results in terms of effectiveness. Various pre-post methodologies have found 
that CIT officers have improved knowledge of mental illness (Compton et al., 2014a; Wells 
& Schafer, 2006; Ellis, 2014), improved attitudes towards PMI (Compton et al., 2014a; 
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Compton, Esterberg, McGee, Kotwicki, & Oliva, 2006; Demir, Broussard, Goulding, & 
Compton, 2009; Ellis, 2014), a higher tendency to choose a referral to a community-based 
mental health service or transfer to a hospital over arrest (Compton et al., 2014b; Steadman 
et al., 2000; Franz & Borum, 2011), improved de-escalation skills (Compton et al., 2014b), 
and improved comfort and confidence when interacting with PMI (Compton et al., 2014a; 
Wells & Schafer, 2006). Further analyses also found that CIT officers are less likely to use 
physical force against a PMI than non-CIT officers (Compton et al., 2011b; Morabito et 
al., 2012; Morabito et al., 2017) and are more likely to use verbal engagement as the highest 
level of force (Compton et al., 2014b). However, the amount of force used by CIT officers 
during a crisis depends on the context of the crisis at hand. For example, in a sample of 135 
officers (48 CIT, 87 non-CIT), Compton et al. (2011b) found that in a scenario where a 
PMI becomes agitated, paranoid, and ignores requests, 6.4% of CIT officers indicated that 
they would use some level of force in that scenario compared to 11.6% of non-CIT officers; 
although, in a scenario where a PMI picks up a large rock and begins walking towards an 
officer, 43.5% of CIT officers indicated that they would use force in this scenario compared 
to 63.1% of non-CIT officers, thus supporting the finding that CIT officers use less force, 
even in situations which are escalating. 
 Furthermore, CIT has been widely accepted by officers. Several studies on police 
perceptions of CIT have concluded that officers perceive CIT as both effective and 
beneficial in interacting with PMI (Deane et al., 1999; Canada et al., 2010; Morabito, 
Watson, & Draine, 2013; Bonfine et al., 2014; Tully & Smith, 2015). Most notably, officers 
perceive that CIT training has the ability to reduce stigma and increase empathy (Hanafi, 
Bahora, Damir, & Compton, 2008). This reduction in stigma and increase in empathy may 
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even ‘rub off’ onto untrained officers, potentially changing the attitudes and stigma 
embedded in the police culture of that particular service (Canada et al., 2010). Ultimately, 
CIT officers believe that they direct more PMI to the appropriate resources as opposed to 
arrest, have a better ability to recognize mental illness, have the skills and patience to de-
escalate a crisis, and have the confidence to effectively address a crisis (Deane et al., 1999; 
Canada et al., 2010; Morabito et al., 2013; Bonfine et al., 2014; Tully & Smith, 2015). 
However, given that the United States has been the ‘forerunner’ in the development 
of police-based crisis response models (Butler, 2014, p. 4), and that CIT is the “most visible 
pre-booking diversion program” in the nation (Steadman et al., 2000, p. 646), there is a 
significant lack of CIT literature beyond the United States, therefore, it is unknown whether 
CITs beyond the United States produce similar results. In the Canadian context, to date, 
there have been no empirical studies on CITs even though such teams exist in Halifax, 
Hamilton, and in certain divisions of the Ontario Provincial Police (Coleman & Cotton, 
2010a; Durbin et al., 2010b; Iacobucci, 2014; Wood, Swanson, Burris, & Gilbert, 2011). 
Literature which does exist on Canadian CITs is extremely limited and may include vague 
data on training modules and objectives which typically mirror the training and objectives 
found in the CIT core elements discussed above (e.g., Coleman & Cotton, 2010a; see 
Appendix 1), but does not include rigorous evaluations or stakeholder perceptions as seen 
in the American literature. This lack of Canadian literature on CITs may simply be due to 
the fact that although CITs have been adopted by some Canadian police agencies, they are 
simply less common than other forms of diversion programs (Butler, 2014; Coleman & 
Cotton, 2010a; Cotton & Coleman, 2010). It has been suggested that one of the 
predominant reasons that CIT is a less popular intervention method in Canada is because 
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deaths of either officers or PMI during interactions in Canada are fairly rare, whereas in 
the United States the numbers are far greater, especially due to the wide availability of 
firearms (Coleman & Cotton, 2010b). Consequently, as firearms are of far less concern to 
Canadian police officers than their American counterparts, there is less concern about 
involving civilian personnel in crisis interventions (Coleman & Cotton, 2010b). Therefore, 
scholars suggest that the co-response model is predominant in Canada. 
Co-Response Teams 
Co-response teams are a police-based diversion strategy which typically has an 
officer partner with a mental health professional (e.g., mental health nurse) who then co-
respond to mental health crises at the request of first responding officers (Iacobucci, 2014). 
The overarching and universal objectives of these teams are similar to that of CIT: de-
escalate crises, prevent injuries, link PMI to the appropriate community-based services, 
and reduce pressure on both the criminal justice system and the mental health system 
(Shapiro et al., 2015). The co-responding model can be a very advantageous response 
which cannot be easily replicated by CIT. First, the pairing of a mental health nurse and 
police officer can bridge the informational gap between the mental health and criminal 
justice systems in order to address a crisis quickly and effectively (Iacobucci, 2014). 
Second, mental health nurses possess a wide array of medical knowledge that cannot be 
easily consumed by a police officer, even with 40-hour CIT training, thus enabling a nurse 
to employ their knowledge to ensure a crisis is deescalated properly. Alternatively, 
although uncommon, a co-response could also encompass a psychiatrist, which could result 
in additional benefits. The findings of such a response indicate that the psychiatrist can 
help a PMI be properly diagnosed, and they are able to prescribe the PMI temporary 
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medication in the case that the PMI may have to wait a significant amount of time to be 
admitted for treatment (Rosenbaum, 2010). The third and final advantage to co-response is 
that specialized training given to officers, in addition to the direct collaborative partnership 
with the mental health system via a mental health specialist, can play a significant role in 
reducing the stigma associated with mental illness found in the police culture (Iacobucci, 
2014).  
 Unfortunately, unlike the aforementioned CIT model, there has been even less 
research conducted on co-response teams. Although, studies which have been conducted 
to date have shown very promising results. In a literature review of three dissertations, 
seven reports, and 11 peer-reviewed publications on co-response, Shapiro et al. (2015) 
found that the co-responding model is able to forge co-operation between the police and 
community-based mental health services, and is able to mitigate the burden on the justice 
system through reduced arrest rates and time spent at a crisis. More specifically, in an 
American evaluation of a co-response in DeKalb, Georgia, Scott (2000) found that the team 
voluntarily hospitalized more PMI (64%) than non-co-response officers who 
predominately non-voluntarily hospitalized PMI (67%). Co-response officers were also 
less likely to arrest a PMI (7%) than non-co-response officers (14%) (Scott, 2000). 
Similarly, co-response teams in Birmingham, Alabama and Knoxville, Tennessee only 
arrested 13% and 5% of PMI, respectively (Steadman et al., 2000).  
 From the Canadian context, a survey of Ontario police services by Durbin et al. 
(2010b) indicated that of the 37 services surveyed, 49% employ a co-response team. 
Whereas other surveys and reports have found that police services in Toronto, Calgary, 
Halifax, Peel Region, Halton Region, Vancouver, and Hamilton have some form of co-
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response (Butler, 2014; Coleman & Cotton, 2010a; Iacobucci, 2014; Wilson-Bates, 2008; 
Wood et al., 2011). However, detailed objectives, training modules, training length, 
amount of co-response officers, amount of calls for service, and relationships with the 
mental health system are largely unexplored within academic literature. Evaluations of 
Canadian co-response teams are far more limited as only three co-response teams – located 
in Halifax, Toronto, and Hamilton – have been evaluated to date.  
The work of Kisley et al. (2010) on the Mental Health Mobile Crisis Team in 
Halifax found that although calls for the team increased significantly one-year and two-
years following co-response implementation, the time spent at a crisis by the team (136 
minutes) was significantly lower than non-co-response officers who were in a control area 
(165 minutes). In addition, PMI who had contact with the team showed greater engagement 
with outpatient services and other mental health services than PMI who encountered 
officers in the non-co-response control group (Kisley et al., 2010). The most detailed body 
of literature on Canadian co-response predominantly focuses on the Mobile Crisis 
Intervention Team (MCIT) employed by the Toronto Police Service (TPS).  
The TPS established their MCIT in 2000 as a response to a recommendation from 
a 1994 Coroner’s Inquest into the death of Lester Donaldson, a PMI shot by a TPS officer 
(Iacobucci, 2014). The aim of the TPS MCIT is to provide prompt support to PMI in crisis, 
avert escalation, reduce pressure on the criminal justice system, and link PMI to appropriate 
services (Iacobucci, 2014). It originally began with a partnership with St. Michael’s 
Hospital and a single TPS division; currently, the TPS MCIT covers all 17 TPS divisions 
and has partnerships with six hospitals in the Toronto area (Iacobucci, 2014). TPS officers 
who have “shown a strong ability to deal effectively with persons in crisis” are selected 
CIT AND CO-RESPONSE IN CANADA 
 
33 
through an internal posting, and successful officers are sent to a week-long training course 
along with MCIT nurses to familiarize the officer and nurse with one another (Iacobucci, 
2014, p. 222). Co-training is typically conducted as a process to de-stigmatize each other’s 
work culture (Steadman et al., 2001). TPS MCIT officers can be part of the unit for a 
minimum of two-years to a maximum of five-years, and work 10-hour shifts which 
typically fall between 11am and 11pm depending on the division and their mental health 
intervention needs (Iacobucci, 2014). Toronto MCITs attend approximately 2,000 calls per 
year, 73% are mental health crises, 22% suicide threats, and the rest concern suicide 
attempts or overdoses (Kirst et al., 2014). 
 Studies which assess the perceptions of stakeholders associated with the TPS MCIT 
overwhelmingly perceive the program positively and as meeting its key goals (Kirst et al., 
2014; Kirst et al., 2015). Most importantly, individuals who had an interaction with the 
MCIT have reported positive interactions, especially during interactions when the nurse 
takes the lead, as opposed to the officer. One PMI stated,  
I think specifically with the team is I’ve had some excellent experience with them 
and also not so great experiences. And I think the difference, if I can pinpoint it to 
what led to a good experience and what led to a not so good experience for the 
consumers that we work with, was if the nurse, you’re right – if the nurse takes the 
lead, things seem to go a lot smoothly because they’re giving direction to the 
officer. ‘He’s fine, this is what we should do’ (Kirst et al., 2014, p. 18) 
 
However, whether the nurse or officer take the lead is dependent on a variety of contextual 
factors, such as whether the team have had an experience with the PMI before, the 
preference of the person in crisis, and the type of call at hand (Kirst et al., 2014). Other 
PMI felt criminalized by the use of handcuffs and marked vehicles, preferred when there 
were fewer responders, preferred having a choice of which hospital to be taken to, and 
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emphasized the value of de-escalation and calming communication (Lamanna et al., 2015). 
Ultimately, evaluations of the TPS MCIT found that the MCIT voluntarily referred more 
PMI to hospital than non-MCIT officers (Lamanna et al., 2015).  
Moreover, some police services go beyond a single form of crisis intervention. For 
example, Halifax employs both a CIT and co-response, whereas, most notably, the 
Hamilton Police Service employ a CIT and co-response, and work collaboratively with a 
mental-health based response – an approach which has been supported by scholars 
(Coleman & Cotton, 2010a; Ghebreslassie, 2017; Iacobucci, 2014). The mental-health 
based response, otherwise known as the Crisis Outreach and Support Team (COAST) was 
formed in 1997 and is centered out of St. Joseph’s Health Centre in Hamilton (Iacobucci, 
2014). COAST is comprised of psychiatric nurses, mental health workers, social workers, 
occupational therapists, and plain-clothed police officers who respond to crises 24 hours a 
day and assist front line responders at their request. However, COAST only responds to 
approximately 25% of Hamilton’s crisis calls as the team is unable to respond to incidents 
which may be unsafe for mental health professionals. Consequently, Hamilton established 
a CIT in 2006 to ensure appropriate interventions occur even when COAST is unable to 
respond, and established a co-response in 2013 to address large call volumes in the center 
of the city (Iacobucci, 2014). While little is known about Hamilton’s CIT, an initial 
evaluation of Hamilton’s co-response team, named the Mobile Crisis Rapid Response 
Team (MCRRT), has displayed very promising results. In addition to diverting PMI out of 
the criminal justice system, the goal of the MCRRT is to avoid unnecessary hospital 
transfers by diverting PMI to community-based services or crisis beds (Fahim, Semovski, 
& Younger, 2016). In a 12-month period compared with non-co-response crisis 
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interventions, employment of the MCRRT resulted in a 49% reduction of people in crisis 
who were brought to hospital (Fahim et al., 2016). Of those taken to hospital, only 20% 
were discharged without psychiatric assessment in contrast to 53% taken to hospital by 
non-co-response crisis interventions (Fahim et al., 2016) – indicating that those who were 
transferred by the MCRRT genuinely needed psychiatric care. 
Ultimately, the pre-arrest diversion model – or combination of models – that police 
services choose to employ will depend on a variety of factors that may be unique to the 
jurisdiction of that service. These factors predominantly concern demographics, urban or 
rural geographies, the programs and services available through the local mental health 
system, and the prevalence of PMI contacts with the police (Butler, 2014; Reuland et al., 
2009). However, several factors may also hinder the potential success of either model in 
any jurisdiction.  
Challenges of CITs and Co-Response 
First and foremost, all CIT and co-response literature stress the need for a central 
and identifiable drop off location for PMI at the local hospital or psychiatric facility with a 
‘no-refusal’ policy and rapid streamlined intakes (Deane et al., 1999; Iacobucci, 2014; 
Steadman et al., 2000; Steadman et al., 2001; Kisely et al., 2010; Dupont et al., 2007). 
Officers who had access to a specific drop off centre were more likely to perceive their 
CIT or co-response as effective (Deane et al., 1999). To put this into perspective, in 
Memphis, Tennessee, the founding city of CIT, officers wait no more than 30 minutes for 
the facility to take custody of a PMI; whereas in Toronto, co-response officers can wait an 
average of two hours at a hospital for the PMI to be transferred into the care of the facility 
(Iacobucci, 2014). Notably, the Hamilton Police Service has mitigated select lengthy 
CIT AND CO-RESPONSE IN CANADA 
 
36 
transfers of custody by allowing officers to assess the risk of the PMI after a 30-minute 
hospital wait – if the officer determines that the PMI poses a low risk to themselves, 
hospital staff, or the public, the officer and a nurse can transfer care of the PMI to the 
hospital (Iacobucci, 2014). Alternatively, officers who wait hours for a PMI to be admitted 
may ultimately not be admitted by the facility, or may be admitted and discharged only a 
few hours later (Canada et al., 2010). Geller (2008) has been particularly critical of CIT 
implementation without properly addressing the revolving door of the mental health 
system. He states that with the revolving door, “CIT might just as well stand for 
Consecutive Interventions without Treatment” (Geller, 2008, p. 58).  
 Consequently, long wait times for transfer of custody may result in CIT or co-
response officers not being able to respond to other PMI who may be in crisis (Iacobucci, 
2014). This essentially may cause very low response rates from CITs or co-response. For 
example, Durbin et al. (2010b) found that of the 49% of Ontario police services that employ 
a co-response team, the teams are only utilized in less than 25% of crisis incidents. A 
similar low response rate is present in Toronto with the TPS co-response team only 
responding to 11% of all crises (Iacobucci, 2014). Low staffing may also affect the 
response of co-response. In Knoxville, Tennessee, the co-response rate is approximately 
40% due to the team consisting of only six officers, resulting in a slow response time 
(Steadman et al., 2000). In-take delays and shortage of CIT/co-response officers could be 
mitigated by training more officers, as in the case of Portland, Oregon where all officers 
are CIT trained (Watson, Morabito, Draine, & Ottati, 2008b). However, this approach is 
contrary to the voluntary element of CIT training. Delays could also be mitigated by 
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allowing officers to assess the risk of PMI, as in the case of Hamilton, but are only 
applicable for low-risk PMI. 
 Another limitation, particularly with respect to the co-response model, is that co-
responses are a secondary response to a mental health crisis, not a primary response. 
Hamilton’s MCRRT is an anomaly of this limitation as they are one of the first co-
responses which are first responders (Fahim et al., 2016). However, former TPS Deputy 
Police Chief Michael Frederico argues that “If we sent the crisis team first, it would be a 
single officer dealing with an uncertain situation at the time and a nurse who is not either 
authorized or trained to deal with a public safety issue” (Ghebreslassie, 2017). 
Contrastingly, Iacobucci (2014) states, 
A key limitation of the MCIT model is the fact that the officer-nurse pair can only 
act as a specialized response. In this respect, it is unfortunate that police officers 
without specialized training in mental health crises are required to make a crisis 
situation safe before the professionals most capable of managing and de-escalating 
that crisis – the MCIT – are allowed to intervene. It is highly arguable that the most 
capable people should be engaged from the outset (p. 225) 
 
This issue of co-responses as second responders has re-emerged following the inquest into 
the TPS shooting death of Andrew Loku in July 2015, along with the issue that co-response 
teams, particularly in Toronto, are not available from 11pm to 11am (Ghebreslassie, 2017; 
Iacobucci, 2014). In contrast, CITs as a first response may be favoured over co-response. 
For example, The Memphis Police Department prefers an ‘immediate’ CIT response 
because such responses, conducted in a humane and calm fashion, allow officers to reduce 
the likelihood of physical confrontations and enhance care of the PMI in crisis (Butler, 
2014). Thus, in the context of CIT, it is specially trained first responding officers who 
attempt to de-escalate a crisis situation, as opposed to a secondary response which may 
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take a significant time to arrive, again, if delayed by the hospital or low co-response 
staffing. Certain police services, such as Halifax, have mitigated the limitations of co-
response by employing both a CIT and co-response team; whereas Hamilton utilizes their 
co-response as a first response. However, even with implementation of specialized training, 
continuous training is important for information retention. 
 Canada et al. (2010), Compton and Chien (2008) and Tully and Smith (2015) found 
that once an officer receives CIT training, they do not get re-trained on mental health 
afterwards. In a sample of 88 CIT trained officers, 70% indicated that they did not have re-
training after becoming a CIT officer (Compton & Chien, 2008). Calls for CIT continuing 
training have been supported by pre-post analyses which suggest that CIT knowledge 
retention may decrease as time elapses. Specifically, Compton and Chien (2008) found that 
after 88 officers completed CIT training, the mean pre-score was 16.7, however, after 
approximately 46.1 weeks a post-test was conducted whose mean score was 14.7. 
Unfortunately, the lack of re-training for CIT officers appears to have been a neglected 
element of the CIT core elements. 
 Finally, the implementation of a CIT or co-response team may be a particularly 
difficult challenge for some jurisdictions, especially rural jurisdictions. Qualitative 
interviews with CIT stakeholders in rural communities found that sending an officer for 
week-long training may be difficult, especially as there may only be a few officers who 
work full-time, and the cost to have an officer CIT trained may be far beyond the available 
budget available for the training of rural officers (Skubby et al., 2013; Geller, 2008). 
Moreover, participants highlighted that rural mental health systems are more 
underdeveloped and underfunded than urban systems. Some participants argued that the 
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federal government tends to divert most funding into urban areas where the money can 
have the biggest impact and ignore rural areas who have a similar lack of community-based 
mental health programs, but on a smaller scale (Skubby et al., 2013). Thus, Geller’s (2008) 
comment on CIT as “Consecutive Interventions without Treatment” is more inevitable in 
rural areas.  
There have been many recommendations for improvement of CIT and co-response 
teams, such as mobility of crisis teams, access to beds, broad staffing specializations 
(Forchuk et al., 2010), 24-hour first responses for co-response teams, employing a CIT in 
conjunction with a co-response, and establishing evaluation periods to ensure that CITs and 
co-response have the best capable officers (Iacobucci, 2014). However, as outlined within 
this literature review, very few studies have actually examined the use and success of CITs 
and co-response, particularly in Canada, therefore, recommendations for ‘improvement’ 
may not even be relevant if it is unknown whether these programs are successful and make 
an impact in the first place. Studies which do exist disproportionally focus on CIT 
employment in the United States, with little evaluations on other jurisdictions or 
interventions, such as co-response (Coleman & Cotton, 2010a; Wood & Watson, 2017). In 
addition, current CIT studies overwhelmingly assess the perceptions of various CIT 
stakeholders, as opposed to evaluating CIT effectiveness (Blevins, Lord, & Bjerregaard, 
2014). This lack of studies on CITs and co-response have been attributed to a lack of data 
available on interactions between PMI and police which can make a methodologically sound 
evaluation extremely difficult (Blevins et al., 2014; Coleman & Cotton, 2010a; Wood & 
Watson, 2017). Therefore, in many cases, police services have employed CITs or co-
responses based on the understanding that it is the current ‘best practice’ available, as 
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opposed to evaluative research which suggests that their specific training module is effective 
(Coleman & Cotton, 2010a, p. 21).  
Undoubtedly, more research is required on the use of CITs and co-responses. 
However, prior to moving on to the present study, which seeks to address the lack of research 
on these responses in Canada, several policing strategies will be briefly presented, and a 
discussion will be put forth to summarize the aforementioned literature through the context 
of these strategies. In place of a traditional theoretical framework, the purpose of presenting 
and discussing these strategies is to provide a contextual framework which will allow for a 
better understanding of the dynamics and reasoning behind police approaches to PMI 
interactions from a policing perspective. Many innovative strategies have developed within 
policing over the last several decades in order to make law enforcement more effective; 
however, as will be exemplified within the context of specialized responses to PMI, it is not 
a single police strategy that is employed to address contacts with this population, but rather 
multiple strategies employed simultaneously. 
Policing Strategies and Mental Illness 
 Since its inception, the policing institution operated on a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model 
known as the ‘three R’s’ – random patrol, rapid response, and reactive investigations 
(Sherman, 2013). This form of policing developed into the dominant model in many 
English-speaking nations until the 1970s when a policing crisis occurred (Sherman, 2013; 
Weisburd & Braga, 2006b). This crisis developed primarily out of the realization that the 
‘three R’s’ strategy was not effective at decreasing nor preventing criminality, thus leading 
to a decrease in public confidence of the police (Weisburd & Braga, 2006a). What stemmed 
from this crisis, however, were significant innovations to the policing institution, such as 
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community policing, risk management, procedural justice, and evidence-based policing, 
which, over the past three decades, transformed policing from being reactive to criminality 
to being proactive (Weisburd & Braga, 2006a). 
One of the first post-crisis strategies to emerge was community policing which 
encouraged the police and community to ‘fight crime’ collaboratively (Weisburd & Braga, 
2006b). This form of policing heavily relies on the decentralization of authority which 
facilitates problem-solving efforts at all levels of the police hierarchy and, as alluded to by 
the name of the strategy, community involvement (Skogan, 2006). Some police services 
may also use community policing as a method to acquire information for another strategy 
used by law enforcement – risk management. The notion of risk was put forth by the work 
of Beck (1992) who argued that through the modernization of society, the world has made 
itself vulnerable to a plethora of new hazards, and that a systematic way of addressing the 
new dangers of our society is through risk management (Beck, 1992). In terms of policing, 
Ericson and Haggerty (1997) argue that the police are ‘knowledge brokers’ for a variety of 
institutions (e.g., insurance companies) whose duty it is to assess risk, and that community 
policing is not only a means of working closely with the community, but is also used to 
gather knowledge and to subsequently assess risk. The police have developed a variety of 
methods to mitigate risk and criminality (Beck, 2002; Murphy, 2007; Phythian, 2012; 
Ransley & Mazerolle, 2009; Schaible & Sheffield, 2012). One such method is intelligence-
led policing which emphasizes the collection and analysis of information to determine 
police action (Ratcliffe, 2011).  
Contrastingly, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing highlighted the 
need for police to transition away from a focus on effective crime control, which may be 
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facilitated through risk-based strategies, toward a focus on how police actions influence 
public trust and confidence, such as procedural justice (Tyler, Goff, & MacCoun, 2015). 
This strategy concerns the fairness and demeanour put forth by officers during interactions 
with the public. Key components of this strategy include: allowing one’s voice to be heard; 
having your rights acknowledged and being treated with dignity, respect, and politeness; 
and trusting that the officer is concerned for the welfare of the individual involved (Lind 
& Tyler, 1988). When an interaction encompasses these components, the individual is more 
likely to view the police as legitimate and are more likely to comply with the officer 
irrespective of the outcome of the interaction (Tyler, 2004; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & 
Mentovich, 2011; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). It is, however, argued that more research is 
required to establish whether procedural justice is effective in police practice (Nagin & 
Telep, 2017), and evidence-based policing is one such strategy which can facilitate 
evaluative research. 
In contrast to the aforementioned ‘three R’s’ of traditional policing, evidence-based 
policing emphasises the ‘three T’ strategy – targeting, testing tracking – in order to 
determine which policing strategies are effective (Sherman, 2013; Huey, Blaskovits, 
Bennell, Kalyal, & Walker, 2017). Targeting refers to the identification of problems that 
must be addressed; testing occurs to ensure that the strategy employed to address the 
problem is achieving its desired goals; and finally, the process of tracking refers to the 
logging of the strategy over time to ensure that it continues to work effectively, as well as 
modifying the strategy, re-testing and re-tracking adjustments to achieve the desired 
outcome (Sherman, 2013).  
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Undoubtedly, in the context of police-PMI interactions, it is evident that risk 
mitigation is the prevailing strategy that police use when interacting with this population. 
As discussed earlier, the focus of the police is the safety and security of the community as 
a whole, therefore, the police may apprehend PMI for being a risk to themselves or others, 
mercy book, or even charge PMI with minor nuisance infractions in order to mitigate risk. 
Contrastingly, mental health training for officers may be considered as a form of risk 
mitigation as well. With officers being trained on mental health, the assumption is that they 
will be better educated and more effective during interactions with this population, while 
simultaneously being more effective at mitigating risks associated with these interactions. 
With the introduction of CITs and co-response, however, we see risk mitigation beginning 
to intertwine with elements of procedural justice, community policing, and evidence-based 
policing in contemporary police-PMI interactions. 
 In comparison with the general population, PMI are four times less likely to think 
that the police treat people fairly (Desmarais et al., 2014). Studies on procedural justice in 
police-PMI interactions have found that officer behaviour can affect the experiences and 
behaviour of PMI within current and future interactions, therefore, procedurally just 
treatment from officers is vital to ensure successful and positive interactions (Livingston 
et al., 2014a; Watson & Angell, 2007; Watson et al., 2008a). Although CIT and co-
response training does not explicitly include elements of procedural justice (Watson & 
Angell, 2007), the increased empathy of officers and improved treatment of PMI during 
CIT/co-response interactions can lead to increased feelings of procedurally just treatment 
in comparison to non-CIT/co-response interactions (Furness, Maguire, Brown, & 
McKenna, 2016). 
CIT AND CO-RESPONSE IN CANADA 
 
44 
 In addition, these responses require the police to partner with community-based 
services and hospitals in order to ensure success. This is particularly emphasized within 
the core elements of the CIT program which stress community involvement and problem-
solving on behalf of the police, community, hospitals, and other stakeholders to collaborate 
on CIT formation, implementation, and ensuring that PMI are directed to the appropriate 
care they may need. The community approach to crisis interventions becomes even closer 
with the use of a co-response model where a citizen (i.e., mental health nurse) and a police 
officer work together to de-escalate crises and direct PMI to the appropriate community-
based service or hospital. The co-responding model in particular also facilitates the 
decentralization of police power by giving the mental health professional the authority to 
intervene and provide solutions in a crisis situation.  
While the use of risk, procedural justice, and community policing is evident within 
police-PMI interactions, evidence-based policing is not as developed in this area. In the 
context of CIT, Watson, Compton, and Draine (2017) argue that the program has the 
potential to become an evidence-based practice for officer-level cognitive and attitudinal 
outcomes, however, far more research is needed to determine if CIT can become an 
evidence-based practice for other outcomes.  
In the Canadian context in particular, very little is known about both CITs or co-
response teams, especially with respect to the foundational information. Beyond the work 
of Coleman and Cotton (2010a) and other evaluative reports, the objectives and goals of 
Canadian CITs and co-responses are largely unknown. In addition, it is unknown how co-
response elements can differ from the CIT elements outlined above, how many CIT/co-
response officers a service trains, what their training modules contain, hours of 
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deployment, their overall structure and organization, and what partnerships/agreements 
services may have with the mental health system in order to ensure the success of these 
programs. Most notably, beyond the services discussed above, it is unknown how many or 
even which Canadian police services employ either a CIT or co-response team. This can 
cause future evaluative research to be difficult as there is no sample to target. Search engine 
results suggest that other services beyond the ones discussed above may employ either a 
CIT or co-response, but limited information is provided. For example, the Durham 
Regional Police (n.d.) has a ‘Mental Health Unit’ page on their website, however, the page 
contains no information and a ‘Coming Soon’ message. Therefore, this thesis seeks to 
contribute to the academic literature by surveying Canadian police services to answer the 
following research questions:  
• Research Question #1: Which Canadian police services employ a CIT and/or 
co-response team;  
• Research Question #2: For the police services who have a CIT and/or co-
response, what are the elements that make up their response to PMI? Such as 
why these responses were established, their goals and objectives, as well as 
their structure and organization; 
• Research Question #3: What are the successes achieved and challenges faced 
by Canadian CIT/co-response teams?   
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
Due to a lack of available data on PMI interactions with police, many prior studies 
which have explored this area have relied on the employment of surveys (e.g., Bonfine et 
al., 2014; Compton et al., 2011a; Cotton, 2004; Durbin et al., 2010b; Tully & Smith, 2015), 
qualitative interviews (e.g., Canada et al., 2010; Girard et a., 2014; Hanafi et al., 2008; 
Morabito et al., 2017; Skubby et al., 2013), or a mixed methodology incorporating both 
surveys and qualitative interviews (e.g., Brink et al., 2011; Kirst et al., 2014; Wells & 
Schafer, 2006). With respect to this thesis, a mixed methodology will be utilized in order 
to obtain both quantitative (i.e., number of CITs/co-response) and qualitative information 
about CITs and co-response employed by police services in Canada. 
Creswell (2011, p. 271) argues that there have been a variety of changing and 
expanding definitions over the last few decades as to what precisely constitutes a ‘mixed’ 
methodology. However, this approach simply “involves philosophical assumptions that 
guide the direction of the collection and analysis and the mixture of qualitative and 
quantitative approaches in many phases of the research process.” Its core premise “is that 
the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches, in combination, provides a better 
understanding of research problems than either approach alone” (Creswell, 2011, p. 271), 
and allows for a problem to be ‘seen’ through multiple ways. Ultimately, the purpose of a 
mixed methods approach is to select and integrate certain techniques found within both 
methods in order to more thoroughly investigate a phenomenon (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 
2011). Therefore, in order to answer the research questions posed herein, a mixed 
methodology will be employed using an online survey (i.e., quantitative), as well as semi-
CIT AND CO-RESPONSE IN CANADA 
 
47 
structured interviews (i.e., qualitative) conducted via telephone to mitigate the 
geographical distances between the researcher and police services (Berg & Lune, 2012).  
Surveys are an inexpensive and time-efficient method that allows for large amounts 
of data to be collected in a short period of time (Palys & Atchison, 2014). Surveys can be 
administered in a variety of different ways, such as pencil-and-paper, via telephone, or via 
the Internet (Palys & Atchison, 2014). The latter method, however, provides additional 
advantages over other forms of survey administration. Specifically, online surveys allow 
for data collection to occur 24 hours a day, they are easier to distribute, technology allows 
for integration of photos, audio, and video, and, finally, online surveys allow for adaptive 
questions where responses to certain questions may determine which subsequent questions 
are displayed to the participant, consequently allowing participants to avoid questions 
which may not pertain to them (Palys & Atchison, 2014). Questions may ultimately be 
structured as either open-ended questions which allow participants to respond in their own 
words, or closed-ended questions which may be single-response questions, categorical 
questions, or rating scales, among many others (Palys & Atchison, 2014).  
On the other hand, semi-structured interviews are also a flexible method of inquiry 
that consists of a set of predetermined questions that are asked in a systematic and 
consistent order, but allow interviewers to probe far beyond the predetermined questions 
when appropriate (Berg & Lune, 2012; Palys & Atchison, 2014). This may consequently 
result in unanticipated information or perspectives to arise that may provide a deeper 
understanding of the phenomenon in question (Berg & Lune, 2012), and may be 
additionally beneficial in research areas that are exploratory or not sufficiently understood 
(Palys & Atchison, 2014) Semi-structured interviews also provide an opportunity for 
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interviewers to ask for clarification to ensure that the participants’ perspective of a 
phenomenon is accurately understood (Berg & Lune, 2012). 
Data Collection 
A 47-question survey was constructed and inputted into the survey program 
Qualtrics (Appendix 4). Upon opening the survey, participants were provided with an 
informed consent form that summarized the purpose of this project, their rights and risks 
as a research participant, as well as what would occur with the data collected (Appendix 
4). With the intention of identifying which Canadian police services employ either a CIT 
and/or co-response, the consent form indicated that the survey data would not be 
confidential, nor anonymous in order to fulfill this research question. In addition, 
participants were informed that for completing the survey, five dollars would be donated 
on their behalf to the Canadian Police Association Robert Memorial Fund to assist the 
families of those who lost their lives in the line of duty. At the bottom of the consent form 
participants were given an option to indicate whether they consented or did not consent to 
participating – those who did not consent were forwarded to the end of the survey, whereas 
those who consented were forwarded to the first question.  
Of the 47 questions, the first 21 questions were concerned with the police service 
as well as mental health training and mental health related interactions (e.g., name of 
service, length of mental health training, number of mental health related interactions, etc.). 
Question 22 asked participants that if their service did not have a CIT and/or co-response, 
were there plans to do so in the near future – services which provided a time-frame or 
indicated no plans to employ one were forwarded to the end of the survey, whereas those 
who selected ‘not applicable’ because their service had a CIT and/or co-response team 
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proceeded to question 23 and the rest of the survey. These questions specifically inquired 
about the CIT and/or co-response at the participants’ service (e.g., why was a CIT/co-
response implemented, hours of operation, objectives, etc.).  
Prior to the distribution of the survey, a list of all Canadian police services was 
compiled. Policing in Canada is conducted at three levels – municipal, provincial, and 
federal – as well as within First Nations communities who run self-administered police 
services (Greenland & Alma, 2016). As of 2016, there were 184 police services in Canada: 
144 municipal, three provincial, one federal, and 36 First Nations (Greenland & Alma, 
2016). Following the creation of the list, the website and email address of every service 
were located through the use of a search engine and added to the list for subsequent survey 
distribution. Efforts were predominantly focused on locating the contact information of 
officers who were specifically in mental health related positions, otherwise the general 
email address for the service was noted. However, websites and email addresses were 
omitted from the list for certain police services if: (1) the service did not have a website, 
or it was not functioning properly at the time of search; (2) there was no email address 
available on the website; and (3) if the service was predominantly French-speaking and did 
not provide an option for an English version of their website. Following these three 
exclusions, the survey was distributed to a total of 102 Canadian police services via email 
in October 2017. 
The emails included a brief introduction to the researcher, the summary and purpose 
of the research, as well as a direct link to the Qualtrics survey (Appendix 5). In addition, 
emails which were not specifically directed towards a mental health related officer and sent 
to the general service email had a request to forward the email to the single most 
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appropriate officer to avoid several officers at the same service completing the survey. As 
surveys were completed, the completion was logged within the aforementioned list; 
similarly, services which explicitly declined to participate were logged as well. Services 
which did not complete the survey, but did not explicitly decline to participate were re-
invited to participate via email in early December 2017 and then again in early January 
2018. Surveys which were partially completed were discarded and interpreted as a 
withdrawal from the project. However, these services were re-invited in the December and 
January rounds of survey re-distribution with the prospect that the survey would be 
forwarded to another officer that would be more willing to participate. 
At the end of the survey, participants were asked if they were willing to participate 
in a semi-structured interview that would allow participants to freely discuss the state of 
mental health policing at their service as well as in Canada, but with confidentiality 
ensured. For doing so, participants were informed that an additional ten dollars would be 
donated to the Canadian Police Association Robert Warner Memorial Fund for a total of 
15 dollars by participating in both data collection portions of this project2. Survey 
participants who provided their contact information for interview participation were 
subsequently contacted via email that included a description of the interview process and 
an inquiry about dates and times that the participant would be available for a one-hour 
telephone interview (Appendix 6). Participants who did not respond to the initial interview 
invitation were followed up with at the beginning of December 2017 and the beginning of 
January 2018 as well. With both initial and follow up emails, participants were also 
                                                 
2 See Appendix 9 for receipt from final donation for 23 survey participants and 10 
interview participants. 
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provided with a consent form for the interview and encouraged to contact the researcher 
should any questions or concerns arise. Otherwise, participants were asked to sign and 
return the consent form prior to the interview (Appendix 7). This consent form did not 
significantly differ from the one provided to participants prior to the survey, with only 
exception being the assurance of confidentiality.  
Participants were asked 13 questions from a 17-question interview guide (Appendix 
8). Four questions on the guide depended on whether the service did have a CIT and/or co-
response – if they did, the CIT/co-response questions were asked; if not, then questions 
about mental health training for frontline officers were asked. Some questions on the 
interview guide were repeated from the survey (e.g., goal/objective of CIT/co-response) in 
anticipation of more elaborated and detailed answers; whereas others inquired about the 
challenges faced by CIT/co-response, as well as the challenges and successes of mental 
health policing in Canada. Interviews lasted between 30 and 75 minutes and were recorded 
on a digital audio recorder. The interviews were then transferred onto a password-protected 
computer file and deleted from the recorder. Subsequently, all interviews were transcribed 
with all potentially identifying information stripped to ensure the confidentiality of the 
participants and their respective police services. Following each transcription, the audio 
file of the interview was deleted leaving only the transcriptions for analysis.    
Data Analysis    
With respect to the survey data, a Qualtrics output was generated in Microsoft Excel 
format that displayed the responses for each participating police service. This method was 
predominantly used to analyze many of the closed-ended and quantitative questions within 
the survey (e.g., number of mental health related interactions, hours of operation for 
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CIT/co-response, etc.) in order to compare and contrast the similarities and differences 
between various Canadian services with respect to these questions. As survey response 
rates for police services are typically very low (Coleman & Cotton, 2010a), the use of 
sophisticated statistical software (e.g., SPSS) was deemed unnecessary and basic analysis 
through Excel was deemed sufficient. 
Moreover, with respect to the open-ended survey responses (e.g., objectives of 
CIT/co-response, etc.) and the interview transcriptions, this data was analyzed with 
qualitative coding software, NVivo. As this area of research is highly exploratory in the 
Canadian context, a grounded, inductive coding approach was used to allow for the 
identification of general themes and ideas to emerge by reading the data, also known as 
open coding (Corbin & Strauss, 2015; Palys & Atchison, 2014). Each open-ended survey 
response and interview transcript was read three times – with a few days in between each 
reading – to ensure that all relevant themes and ideas were identified. Subsequently, axial 
coding occurred whereby the themes/ideas identified during open coding were sorted into 
more specific categories, otherwise known as a coding frame, which was ultimately used 
to organize data and identify the findings (Corbin & Strauss, 2015; Berg & Lune, 2012) 
presented below. Axial coding also occurred three times on three different days to ensure 
the accuracy of the codes, as well as the accuracy of the overall coding frame.    
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Chapter Four: Results 
As of March 1, 2018, officers from 23 Canadian police services completed the 
online Qualtrics survey for a response rate of 22.5% (Table #1). Officers from ten (43.5%) 
services also elected to participate in a confidential semi-structured interview. In line with 
the assured confidentiality of the semi-structured interviews, interview participants will be 
identified by a participant number; whereas results from the survey will be identified by 
police service. The results will be presented below within three sections: (1) Participants 
and Mental Health Police Interactions in Canada where the participating police services 
will be presented along with data related to PMI interactions and their conclusions; (2) 
Specialized Mental Health Responses in Canada which includes results pertaining to 
structure and organization of specialized responses, factors leading to implementation, as 
well as goals and objectives; and finally, (3) Successes and Challenges of Mental Health 
Policing in Canada where the successes and challenges of Canadian police services as it 
pertains to the policing of PMI, as well as those of specialized mental health responses, 
will be presented. 
Participants and Mental Health Police Interactions in Canada 
Many provinces had at least one service participate: six services (26.1%) are located 
in British Columbia (Central Saanich, Nelson, New Westminster, Port Moody, Vancouver, 
Victoria), three (13%) in Saskatchewan (Regina, Saskatoon, Weyburn), one (4.3%) in 
Manitoba (Winnipeg), ten (43.5%) in Ontario (Brantford, Brockville, Chatham-Kent, 
Durham Region, LaSalle, London, Peel Region, St. Thomas, Windsor, York Region), one 
(4.3%) in Quebec (Mont-Tremblant), one (4.3%) in Prince Edward Island (Charlottetown), 
and one (4.3%) in Nova Scotia (Annapolis Royal). Most (n = 17, 74%) indicated that their 
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jurisdiction was within an urban area, one service (4.3%) indicated a rural jurisdiction, and 
five (22%) indicated a jurisdiction comprised of both urban and rural areas. Many of the 
participating services have 100 sworn officers or less (n = 10, 43.5%), six services (26.1%) 
have more than 500 sworn officers, three (13%) have between 401 and 500, one (4.3%) 
has between 201 and 300, and three services (13%) have between 101 and 200 sworn 
officers. 
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3 The question used to collect this data asked for an approximate number, as such, these 
figures should be interpreted with caution. 
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 With respect to PMI interactions, almost all services indicated that interactions with 
this population are very common (n = 18, 78%), four (17.4%) indicated somewhat common, 
and one service (4.3%) indicated that interactions with this population are rare within their 
jurisdiction. In 2016, PMI interactions for these police services ranged from eight in 
Annapolis Royal, NS, to 12,500 in Vancouver, BC, with a mean amount of interactions at 
2,985; whereas apprehensions of this population in the same year under provincial mental 
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health legislation ranged from 29 in Weyburn, SK, to 7,000 in Peel Region, ON, with a 
mean amount of 1,000 apprehensions.  
The difference between interactions and apprehensions, however, differs 
significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For instance, in 2016, officers in St. Thomas, 
ON had approximately 2,500 interactions, but only 100 apprehensions under mental health 
legislation – a difference of 2,400 (96%) interactions; whereas in the same year, officers in 
Peel Region had approximately 7,500 interactions, but 7,000 apprehensions – a difference 
of 500 interactions (6.7%). Survey participants were not specifically asked to elaborate on 
the difference between interactions and apprehensions at their service, or the decision-
making factors which may lead an officer to apprehend a PMI as opposed to referring them 
to community-based mental health resources. Nevertheless, interview participants 
emphasized that, at times, determining what should occur after an interaction may be 
significantly complicated because several factors may affect how an interaction ultimately 
concludes. 
Officers indicated that de-escalation is most commonly the first objective of first 
responders, except when there is a high degree of danger or risk from the beginning:  
I think all police at this point in stage of training, and just best practice, are always 
obligated to attempt some kind of crisis de-escalation. The only time where we're 
not expected to do that is in serious crisis states, so we're talking about when 
somebody pulls a firearm or knife at you and there's no time to negotiate with these 
people. But other than that, that's an expectation (Participant 5) 
Interactions with PMI were also described as being on a continuum where de-
escalation is attempted on the lower end when someone is in an agitated state, to a 
full-scale emergency response on the other side of the spectrum, depending on what 
is being dealt with: 
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The very initial meeting with somebody, there's always got to be that de-escalation 
piece. Not that somebody's always escalated, but if they are, de-escalation's always 
the primary responsibility of the first responders to get the situation a little bit in 
hand so they can sit down and have a conversation with somebody. Sometimes [it’s] 
just that the person's agitated, right? Or it could be up to the very point where they're 
holding mom or dad or their neighbour hostage, right? You're going to get various 
responses in relation to what we first see. So, it might be simply a to officer response 
right up to full-scale, Emergency Response Unit, helicopter, K-9 and all those kinds 
of things depending on what we're dealing with (Participant 10) 
 
Although, if de-escalation is appropriate and occurs successfully, or if officers interact with 
someone who may not necessary be ‘escalated’, then conclusions other than apprehension 
under mental health legislation may be enacted, such as simply sending them home: 
I would say the vast majority we deal with on a 1-to-1 basis on the street, assess, 
and in most cases, we’ll send people on their way. We'll have a chat with them. If 
they're talking to themselves, or their yelling, or something like that, we can deal 
with them, usually, on a 1-to-1, send them home, walk them up to mental health. 
But yeah, it doesn't require an arrest or an apprehension (Participant 3) 
 
Or connecting them to community-based resources: 
 
Most common resolution, probably 70% are resolved through crisis de-escalation, 
and either an update, reconnection, new referral/new connection to a community 
partner or mental health. So, ‘resolved at scene’ or they're potentially just driven 
over to our community mental health to see somebody there (Participant #4) 
 
Contrastingly, if de-escalation is necessary but fails, and the attending officer(s) 
have deemed the individual to be a danger to themselves or others, officers will use their 
powers under their province’s mental health legislation in order to apprehend the individual 
and transport them to a designated facility for a psychiatric evaluation: 
… at some point [if the officers] made the determination that they fit the criteria of 
the Mental Health Act, they’re coming [….] I won't say it's straight forward, but, if 
it's going to be a mental health call, then we're going to use our powers under the 
Mental Health Act in our province which allows us to apprehend if they're a danger 
to themselves or a danger to others […] Typically, in those occasions it's going to 
be what would be an 'involuntary admission' – we're actually going to take them in 
the back of a police car to the [hospital] and then have a doctor examine them 
(Participant 2) 
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Furthermore, if the interaction has a criminal element, the officer’s options for how to 
proceed become tangled between two pieces of legislation: the provincial mental health act 
and the Criminal Code of Canada. For instance, one officer stated, that “… when things 
become too violent and it has to proceed along a criminal route – and that's something that 
we will do – the criminal code is always – as a federal legislation – more committing than 
the provincial act, which is the Mental Health Act as a provincial criteria” (Participant 8). 
Another officer indicated that, even though an officer makes a determination that someone 
committing a crime has some form of mental illness, they may not meet the requirements 
of an apprehension and may have to be processed criminally: 
… if we find somebody suffering – depending on what they did too, we do have to 
deal with the criminal part of it, and if we don't feel that their mental health is where 
they're at risk... They could be committing a crime and be suffering from a mental 
illness, but we can't bring them to the hospital for that, right? Because they're two 
parts of apprehension, one is them suffering from a mental illness, but the other part 
is that they're at risk to harm themselves or others. Stealing a roast from the local 
shop to trade it for drugs – and that's what they do, just so you know – you can't 
apprehend somebody for that, so you would arrest them in that case… (Participant 
3) 
 
Despite the complexities highlighted above, when ranking case conclusions from 
most common to least common, many services indicated that most of their interactions 
concluded informally – that is, interactions with no apprehensions or referrals to a 
community-based mental health service (i.e., ‘walk away’ interactions) (Table 2). The 
second most common conclusion was identified as referrals to community-based mental 
health services, followed by involuntary transport to a designated facility (i.e., 
apprehension), and arrest as the least common conclusion. However, even when situations 
arise where officers may be conflicted or unsure of how to proceed, the use of specialized 
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responses can help responding officers make the appropriate decision that may 
significantly benefit the individual involved in the interaction: 
Sometimes, objectively, not everybody would agree on the same thing, but it's what 
the officer is dealing with in front of them. My team helps make a proper assessment 
with that. So, I've got a mental health police officer, who's a sworn officer, as well 
as a crisis worker who are, for the most part, that's all they do. The crisis workers 
come with the experience in relation to better recognition of the signs and 
symptoms, or what the diagnosis may be, and the issues that the medications may 
cause in relation to somebody, and the ability to refer people to resources as 
opposed to say, 'You know? We have no option other than apprehend this person 
because this person needs some connections to resources', where a crisis worker 
can say, 'I can make those connections, we can leave this person at home. You don't 
have to apprehend them and take them to a hospital’ (Participant #10) 
In the sections that follow, results pertaining to such specialized responses in Canada will 
be presented and discussed.  
 
Table #2: Most Common Conclusion of PMI Contacts3 
Conclusion #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 
Informal 13 (65%) 2 (10%) 0 (0%) 2 (10%) 2 (10%) 1 (5%) 






1 (5%) 8 (40%) 4 (20%) 7 (35%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Voluntary 
Transport 





2 (10%) 4 (20%) 11 (55%) 1 (5%) 2 (10%) 0 (0%) 
Other 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (5%) 19 (95%) 
                                                 
3 This question had a response rate of 86.9% (n = 20). 




Specialized Mental Health Responses in Canada 
As discussed in Chapter Two, specialized responses to mental health calls or mental 
health crises can take many forms depending on a variety of factors. At the general level, 
these responses can take the form of a mental health-based response, a police-based 
specialized mental health response (e.g., co-response), or a police-based specialized police 
response (e.g., CIT). Of the 23 services that participated in this study, all but six – 
Winnipeg, MB; Annapolis Royal, NS; LaSalle, ON; Charlottetown, PEI; Mont-Tremblant, 
QC; and Weyburn, SK – have at least one of the three aforementioned responses in some 
form or another (Table 3).  
Table #3: Composition of Specialized Mental Health Responses 
Police Service Composition of Response 
[BC] Central 
Saanich4 
The Greater Victoria Region has a variety of integrated units 
comprised of officers from this region5. The Integrated Mobile 
Crisis Response Team (IMCRT) is comprised of nurses, 
counsellors, child and youth mental health clinicians, and two 
police officers – one from Saanich and the other from Victoria. 
Officers from Oak Bay and Central Saanich occasionally fill in. 
Hours of Operation: 1200-2400, 7 days/week 
Assign/Volunteer: Either | Rotation: Yes (3 years) 
Response: Requested by frontline  
[BC] Nelson 
Work informally with a mental health team from the health 
authority who can co-respond if available. 
Hours of Operation: 0800-1600, Monday-Friday 
Assigned/Volunteer: N/A | Rotation: N/A 
Response: Requested by frontline  
[BC] New 
Westminster 
Two mental health-specific officers who work in conjunction 
with those from the mental health system. The two positions are 
a hybrid liaison/co-responder position, but are not a dedicated 
co-response (i.e., do not have a dedicated mental health specialist 
partner). The positions also provide support/consultation to the 
                                                 
4 The composition of this response is reported as identical to that of Victoria, BC. 
5 See: http://cspolice.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Annual-Report.pdf   
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frontline, and they co-respond on an ‘as available/as appropriate’ 
basis with an available mental health worker or the mental health 
worker of the individual in crisis. 
Hours of Operation: 0700-1700, Monday-Friday 
Assign/Volunteer: Volunteer | Rotation: Yes (5 years) 
Response: Requested by frontline 
[BC] Port Moody 
One mental health-specific officer who works on a casual basis 
with mental health partners. Provides support/consultation to the 
frontline and liaises/co-responds with community mental health 
teams as needed. 
Hours of Operation: 0700-1700, Tuesday-Friday 
Assigned/Volunteer: Assigned | Rotation: No 
Response: Requested by frontline 
[BC] Vancouver 
Mental Health Unit – named ‘Car 87’ – is a co-response with a 
nurse and an officer. There is a morning and afternoon car (i.e., 
two teams/day). Four officers are in this unit. Beyond the crisis 
response, Vancouver also has five Assertive Community 
Treatment Teams (ACT), with two officers embedded within, 
that provide service for clients who have been unsuccessful in 
traditional care models. ACT can assist in finding long-term care, 
housing, and more. Finally, an Assertive Outreach Team (AOT) 
is made up of four officers, nurses, and psychiatrists who are a 
short-term bridging service from hospital or corrections to a 
primary care provider. Both ACT and AOT attempt to locate and 
help clients who may be at risk and prevent issues before they 
happen. 
Hours of Operation: 0700-1815 & 1600-0345, 7 days/week 
(Car 87); 0700-1615, 7 days/week (ACT); 0700-2300, 7 
days/week (AOT) 
Assigned/Volunteer: Assigned | Rotation: Yes (5 years) (Car 
87) 
Response: Requested by frontline (Car 87) 
[BC] Victoria 
The Greater Victoria Region has a variety of integrated units 
comprised of officers from this region5. The Integrated Mobile 
Crisis Response Team (IMCRT) is comprised of nurses, 
counsellors, child and youth mental health clinicians, and two 
police officers – one from Saanich and the other from Victoria. 
Officers from Oak Bay and Central Saanich occasionally fill in. 
In addition to the crisis response, Victoria also has four Assertive 
Community Treatment Teams (ACT), with three officers 
embedded within, that can assist in finding long-term care, 
housing, and more. 
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Hours of Operation: 1200-2400, 7 days/week (IMCRT); 0630-
2000, 5 days/week (ACT) 
Assigned/Volunteer: Either | Rotation: Yes (3 years) (IMCRT) 
Response: Requested by frontline (IMCRT) 





Two Mobile Crisis Rapid Response Teams (MCRRT) comprised 
of an officer/mental health care specialist co-response, and one 
Mobile Crisis Team (MCT) comprised of mental health care 
specialists who respond at the request of frontline. 
Hours of Operation: 0900-1700 & 1500-2300, Monday-Friday 
(MCRRT), Unknown for MCT 
Assigned/Volunteer: Assigned | Rotation: No (MCRRT) 
Response: First response if available (MCRRT); requested by 
frontline (MCT) 
[ON] Brockville 
One officer is partnered with a mental health worker who 
conduct proactive outreach work, but can be requested by 
frontline at any time. 
Hours of Operation: Fluid hours/days 
Assigned/Volunteer: Either | Rotation: No 
Response: Requested by frontline 
[ON] Chatham-
Kent 
The HELP Team is comprised of officers who are specially 
trained on mental health6. One HELP officer is paired with a 
psychiatric crisis nurse to form the Mobile Crisis Team (MCT) 
for co-response. 
Hours of Operation: 0800-1600, Monday-Friday (MCT) 
Assigned/Volunteer: Assigned | Rotation: Yes (4 years) (MCT) 
Response: First response (HELP); requested by frontline (MCT) 
[ON] Durham 
Region 
Two co-response teams where an officer is paired with a nurse. 
Hours of Operation: 0800-2100, Days unknown 
Assigned/Volunteer: Either | Rotation: - 
Response: Requested by frontline 
[ON] LaSalle 
N/A – In process of implementing a co-response with social 
worker at time of data collection. 
                                                 
6 See: http://ckpolice.com/help-team-mobile-crisis-team/ 




Work with a mental health-based crisis team through a formal 
agreement. Not a dedicated pairing, but are on call and respond 
as needed. 
Hours of Operation: 24 hours/day 
Assigned/Volunteer: N/A | Rotation: N/A 
Response: Requested by frontline 
[ON] Peel Region 
Crisis Outreach and Support Team (COAST) is a co-response 
team comprised of a mental health specialist and a police officer. 
Four officers are on COAST, with two officers on duty. COAST 
also connects individuals with community programs. 
Hours of Operation: 1100-2300, 7 days/week (Mental health 
specialist works 1200-2130) 
Assigned/Volunteer: Assigned | Rotation: No 
Response: Requested by frontline 
[ON] St. Thomas 
Canadian Mental Health Association (CMHA) worker co-
responds with an officer. 
Hours of Operation: 0700-1500, Days unknown 
Assigned/Volunteer: - | Rotation: - 
Response: Requested by frontline 
[ON] Windsor 
Two Community Outreach and Support Teams (COAST) 
comprised of two officers and two crisis workers who facilitate 
access to community services and supports. COAST is a support 
team, not a response team, and will only attend crisis calls if the 
individual is a COAST client. 
Hours of Operation: 0800-1600 & 1400-2000, Monday-Friday 
Assigned/Volunteer: Assigned | Rotation: Yes (3 years) 
Response: Requested by frontline if individual is a COAST 
client 
[ON] York Region 
One co-response with an officer and a crisis worker, and two on 
call crisis workers who can respond to calls when requested by 
frontline) 
Hours of Operation: 1000-2200, 7 days/week (Co-response); 
0900-2400, 7 days/week (Crisis workers) 
Assigned/Volunteer: Either | Rotation: No (Co-response) 
Response: Strives to be first response (Co-response); requested 











Two Police and Crisis Teams (PACT) where an officer is paired 
with a social worker. Four officers are on PACT, and on each 
shift there are two PACT-trained frontline officers to fill in or to 
attend calls when PACT is not working. 
Hours of Operation: 0900-2100, Monday-Friday (Social worker 
works 0900-2000) 
Assigned/Volunteer: Volunteer | Rotation: Yes (5 years) 
Response: Requested by frontline 
[SK] Saskatoon 
Two Police and Crisis Teams (PACT) where an officer is paired 
with a mental health trained social worker. 
Hours of Operation: 0700-1900 & 1300-0100, Days unknown 
(Officers work 12-hour shifts; social workers work 10-hour 
shifts) 
Assigned/Volunteer: Either | Rotation: (3-5 years) 
Response: First response 
[SK] Weyburn N/A 
 
Structure and Organization 
As suggested by the findings provided in Table 3, while there appear to be 
similarities between services with respect to the structure of their specialized response, 
such as in New Westminster, BC and Port Moody, BC where officers liaise and co-
responded as needed, there are also a large variety of differences from service to service. 
The predominant difference that arises within the structures of the participating services 
are that some deploy a mental health-based response only (e.g., Nelson, BC; London, ON); 
whereas others deploy a dedicated7 co-response (e.g., Vancouver, BC; Saskatoon, SK), a 
combination of a mental health-based and a dedicated co-response (e.g., Brantford, ON; 
York Region, ON), two dedicated co-responses (e.g., Durham Region, ON; Regina, SK), 
                                                 
7 The term ‘dedicated’ refers to the officer/mental health specialist pair who co-respond 
together. However, ‘co-response’ itself is a term that may be used for both mental health 
responses and police-based specialized mental health responses. 
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or have officers who are not dedicated, but work in a hybrid co-response/liaison role (e.g., 
New Westminster, BC; Port Moody, BC). Additional differences arise in Central Saanich, 
BC and Windsor, ON. The former does not have its own specialized response as the Greater 
Victoria Region has an Integrated Mobile Crisis Response Team (IMCRT) comprised of 
officers from Victoria, BC and Saanich, BC, where officers from Central Saanich, BC 
occasionally fill in if needed; whereas the latter has a two Community Outreach and 
Support Teams (COAST) which are described as support teams, not co-response teams, 
meaning that COAST in Windsor, ON will only “… attend a call on the road if they are 
already a COAST client.” 
Further differences are also found in term of the hours of operation, whether the co-
response is requested by frontline officers, whether officers are assigned or volunteer for 
the position, and whether there is a rotation period in place for the position. With respect 
to the hours of operation, there is wide variety between the responses at different services 
as hours are typically set based on the needs of the jurisdiction – almost all of the 
participating services lack of 24-hour availability. However, even if the co-response is 
available to attend while within working hours, most appear to be a secondary response 
after frontline officers attend the scene. Of the participating services, only three indicated 
that their co-response is the first response to a mental health call, or strives to be the first 
response. Moreover, there is quite the variety with respect to whether officers are assigned 
or volunteer to co-response positions. The latter, as discussed in Chapter Two within the 
context of CIT literature, is most preferable as it ensures that the most appropriate officers 
are within these positions.  Finally, while many services indicated no rotation period, some 
indicated that officers are only able to stay in these positions for a limited period of time. 
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One service elaborated by indicating this was due to “… career pathing, stress, burnout, 
flow of staff, etc.”  
However, findings concerning CIT employment – or police-based specialized 
police responses – are not as clear. Within the survey, participants were asked to select the 
response types employed at their service (Appendix 4).  In total, eight of the participating 
services indicated that they had a CIT, but later in the survey described a mental health-
based response and/or a police-based specialized mental health response, as displayed in 
Table 3. Upon re-confirming with the websites of all participating services, it was found 
that Chatham-Kent, ON what the only service which explicitly indicated that they employ 
a CIT-like response – known as the HELP Team – in addition to their police-based 
specialized mental health response. 
Factors Leading to Implementation of Specialized Response 
With respect to why services implemented their specialized mental health response, 
many factors were identified and typically surrounded two themes: (1) high volume and 
chronic calls related to mental illness; and (2) the services’ realization and 
acknowledgement that there needed to be an improvement with how they responded to 
these high volume and chronic calls for service. For instance, one officer’s time on patrol, 
and then on their service’s Emergency Response Tactical Team, made them realize that 
another approach was needed for chronic mental health calls: 
… from working years as a patrol responder, and then having spent some time on 
our Emergency Response Tactical Team, just recognizing that a lot of the calls we 
were going to seemed to involve some significant mental illness and mental health 
challenges, and recognizing that as a police agency we could do things differently 
and do things better (Participant 4) 
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In another jurisdiction, chronic interactions in their downtown core led this officer’s service 
to establish a specialized response: 
… some of our core neighborhoods, that are around the downtown, is kind of a 
whole melting pot of types of calls that we respond to. Many of those calls involve 
vulnerable persons with a […] comorbidity of mental health and addictions issues. 
What we would continually do is we would deal with them day in and day out and 
we were looking – always looking – for a better way (Participant 7) 
 
Officers from New Westminster, BC; Port Moody, BC; Victoria, BC; Brantford, ON; Peel 
Region, ON; and Windsor, ON also mirrored comments on increased calls for service as 
to why their service established a specialized response. Officers from Victoria, BC and 
Windsor, ON also added that high volume and chronic mental health calls can lead to long 
hospital wait times which was another reason for their respective services.  
In terms of response improvement, officers from Vancouver, BC; Brantford, ON; 
Brockville, ON; York Region, ON; and Saskatoon, SK all noted improvement, 
effectiveness, and/or efficiency as to why a specialized response was established. For 
instance, the officer from Chatham-Kent, ON indicated that “patrol officers are very busy 
and don’t have the time to adequately deal and get the help required”; whereas another 
officer explained that his service’s reason for establishing a specialized response 
surrounded the realization that frontline officers were not necessarily the most appropriate 
response: 
So, at the time, there was a committee, and everybody sort of sat down and decided 
there needs to be a response, other than just [a] frontline policing response where 
officers – depending on who they are – may or may not have any idea about what 
a mental health issue might be, or mental illness, what medications, or what 
resources are available out in the community. So, their only response was to 
apprehend in the vast majority of times. The team was formed as a result of that… 
(Participant 10) 
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Ultimately, by establishing a specialized response, services believed that it would not only 
improve interactions with this population and address the high volume and chronic mental 
health calls, but that the response would also lower call times, assist frontline officers, 
assist those with mental illness in acquiring psychiatric assistance/support, and foster 
collaboration with their local mental health system. 
Goals and Objectives 
Many of the reasons for implementing specialized responses are also mirrored 
within each services’ goals and objectives for their specialized response (Table 4). Most 
services do not have a single goal or objective, but rather many that intertwine. Overall, 
the identified goals and objectives fell into three interrelated themes: (1) assisting those 
with mental illness, (2) supporting individuals with mental illness in the community, and 
(3) reducing the need for police intervention and transfers to hospital. Most services 
indicated one – or a combination – of these themes within their objectives.  
Table #4: Goals and Objectives of Specialized Mental Health Responses 




[BC] Nelson -  
[BC] New 
Westminster 
“Safely support individuals in the community experiencing a 
mental health crisis through collaboration with community 
mental health partners thereby reducing the selected person’s risk 
to self or others. An additional objective is to reduce the 
likelihood of the individual’s likelihood of experiencing repeat 
crises through the appropriate connection to mental health 
services in the community.” 
[BC] Port Moody 
“Ultimately, to decrease the need for police intervention in 
persons experiencing a mental health crisis, while at the same 
time, ensuring that mental health clients are able to access the 
mental health and social resources they require.” 
[BC] Vancouver 
“Car 87/88, ACT and AOT divert mental health incidents from 
patrol and provide more appropriate mental health services for 
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clients whose primary concern is health-related and is not a 
criminal concern.” 
[BC] Victoria 
Reduce calls for service involving mental health crisis, reduce 
hospital presentations of individuals experiencing mental health 
crisis, intervention before stage 4 crisis, support to front line 
staff, better level of care to those who are experiencing mental 
health challenges.” 





“To assist those in our community that suffer from mental health 
issues. Not every person in crisis needs to be taken to the 
hospital. The MCRRT team helps divert individual from the 
hospital and find more appropriated supporting agency in the 
community. This in turn assists the hospital with the volume in 
their emergency room. The MCRRT teams assist with creating a 
safer and healthier community.” 
[ON] Brockville 
“To improve timely referral and engagement with individuals in 
the community suffering from mental health issues. One goal 
being to reduce unwanted, or negative police interactions that are 
traditionally a heavy drain on police recourses.” 
[ON] Chatham-
Kent 
“The MCT is a secondary response unit that provides support to 
front line members, builds and maintains relationships with 
community partners while maintaining a trust between police and 




[ON] LaSalle - 
[ON] London 
“To deliver the best, and most appropriate, mental health care to 
members of the public in need.” 
[ON] Peel Region 
“The overall objective is to decrease the number of mental health 
calls received by front line officers by providing the essential 
support needed by the caller (EDP) emotionally disturbed person 
during the early visits. In addition, by attending and assisting or 
being available to the front-line officer for a consult with regards 
to the interaction with the EDP will assist in the final direction 
that is taken, i.e.,: apprehension or not. Bottom line, officers are 
spending too much time in the hospitals waiting for a doctor to 
see the EDP before they can return back to road.” 
[ON] St. Thomas - 
[ON] Windsor 
“Our team is there to lower the amount of mental health calls for 
front line officers and lower the amount of visits to the 
emergency department. This is a system/community issue not 
just a police issue therefore this partnership has expanded to 
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educating our officers and other services providers with respect 
to the resources available other than the ED, expanding their 
knowledge with respect to mental health and de-escalation 
techniques. With the increase in the use of opioids and 
homelessness, our calls for service are on the rise, COAST has 
become the hub for all community agencies to contact in attempt 
to assist those in crisis.” 
[ON] York Region 
“To deliver the highest quality service to those suffering from 
mental health crises in the community. To provide coordinated 








“Create an environment and a network between, Regina Police 
Service, Saskatchewan Health Authority and the community that 
would maintain an environment of trust and support to produce 
an efficient access for people struggling with a mental health 
illness. In addition to stabilizing vulnerable people in the 
community, PACT will participate in the development of training 
and education to continuously improve upon interactions 
between police and people with mental illness (and persons with 
complex needs such as, addictions).” 
[SK] Saskatoon 
“Reduction in mental health calls for service requiring police 
response, reduction in repeat calls for service involving the same 
person, calls resolved/de-escalated and triaged to appropriate 
service, proper use of Emergency department, arrest diversions, 
reduction in police wait times at hospital.” 
[SK] Weyburn N/A 
Assisting Those with Mental Illness. The contents of this theme particularly 
concern objectives that indicate generally assisting those with mental illness. For instance, 
the goal and objective of the response in London, ON is, “To deliver the best, and most 
appropriate, mental health care to members of the public in need.” Similarly, part of the 
goal and objective of the response in Brantford, ON is, “To assist those in our community 
that suffer from mental health issues”; whereas in Brockville, ON it is, “To improve timely 
referral and engagement with individuals in the community suffering from mental health 
issues.”  Moreover, another part of this theme also concerns assisting those with mental 
CIT AND CO-RESPONSE IN CANADA 
 
71 
illness by providing better service from a law enforcement perspective. For example, part 
of Vancouver, BC’s objective is to “… provide more appropriate mental health services 
for clients whose primary concern is health-related and is not a criminal concern”; whereas, 
part of the goal and objective in York Region, ON is, “To deliver the highest quality service 
to those suffering from mental health crises in the community.” 
Supporting in the Community. A second identified objective is to support those 
with mental illness in the community, which can encompass a variety of approaches, such 
as connecting PMI to community-based resources, collaborating with community-based 
organizations, and conducting proactive outreach to ensure that those who are being treated 
in the community are looked after and do not reach crisis. 
For instance, the objective in New Westminster, BC is to, “Safely support 
individuals in the community experiencing a mental health crisis through collaboration 
with community mental health partners thereby reducing the selected person’s risk to self 
or others” and to “reduce the individual’s likelihood of experiencing repeat crises through 
the appropriate connection to mental health services in the community”; whereas in Port 
Moody, BC part of their objective is to ensure “… that mental health clients are able to 
access the mental health and social resources they require.” 
For some, collaboration with community-based organizations and health are also 
key to their objectives, which in turn, may assist in supporting members of this population 
in the community. For example, the objective in Chatham-Kent, ON is that, “The MCT is 
a secondary response unit that provides support to front line members, builds and maintains 
relationships with community partners while maintaining a trust between police and 
persons afflicted with mental health issues”; whereas in Regina, SK, the objective is to, 
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“Create an environment and a network between, Regina Police Service, Saskatchewan 
Health Authority and the community that would maintain an environment of trust and 
support to produce an efficient access for people struggling with a mental health illness.” 
Moreover, in addition to their specialized mental health responses, some officers in both 
Vancouver, BC and Victoria, BC are integrated within Assertive Community Treatment 
Teams (ACT) whose primary objective is to assist individuals in stabilizing in the 
community. Such teams “… focus on the well-being of clients who are experiencing 
challenges related to community living, and who have an extensive history of police 
involvement and high use of health services” (Vancouver Police, 2016). They are 
comprised of psychiatrists, social workers, nurses, counsellors, therapists, and police 
officers, and “may assist with finding long-term 24/7 health care, support with life skills, 
job training, assistance with housing, and help maintaining physical and mental wellness” 
(Vancouver Police, n.d.). Select officers in Vancouver, BC are also integrated within a 
dedicated Assertive Outreach Team (AOT) which provides short-term support for 
individuals with mental health issues when they transition from health or the criminal 
justice system into the community (Vancouver Police, n.d.)  
Furthermore, supporting those in the community can also mean being proactive. 
One participant provided an example of an analogy as to why it is important to be proactive 
with mental health: 
I just went to one of their conferences a short while ago, and it's called 'Before Stage 
4'. And so, the analogy they draw is with cancer. With cancer, you want to catch it 
at stage one and stage two because by the time it reaches stage four, there’s nothing 
that you can do anymore. Mental health is not that much different, so if you look at 
stage four of mental illness, that's somebody who is in crisis. The goal should be to 
intervene before they hit crisis. Once somebody hits crisis, the only opportunity we 
can have then is responding to crisis. And I don't think we ever get ahead of the 
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curve if we're doing that. We need to be way more innovative, and way more 
intuitive, and collaborating with health teams (Participant 10) 
 
Being proactive may also bring additional benefits, such as officers who develop a rapport 
with their clients and are able to influence those who need treatment to seek it:  
I'm kind of a bit more assertive because I leave my card and tell someone who lives 
with schizophrenia, is chronically delusional, and not taking medication – 'I really 
think you should go to Mental Health' –  they are never going to go to Mental 
Health. It's a very rare that they might. So, it might be just developing that rapport 
over time – kind of softly introducing to them, 'Look, I'm really concerned, and I 
hear that you're concerned over people breaking into your house. It's obviously 
stressful for you. I'd like to help you manage that stress'. And then it usually comes 
to some kind of voluntary agreement where, ‘Would you come meet with a mental 
health clinician with me and we can kind of get you set up with some programs 
hopefully to help you manage that stress?' 'Sure, okay'. And then months down the 
road, they are doing much better because they are medicated and connected with a 
team […] So, somebody, at some point, has got to be more assertive for the people 
that are going to fall through a crack (Participant 5) 
 
Another officer indicated that his service conducts post-crisis follow-ups to ensure that 
individuals are able to absorb information regarding community-based resources that they 
may access:  
[We] facilitate subsequent follow-ups if required […] When we speak to people in 
crisis they sometimes don't have the ability to absorb all of the information that 
we're giving them, right? So, they're dealing with a crisis, and then you expect 
somebody to go, 'Okay, I'm going to give all this information, and they are going 
to completely understand', or the families for that matter. So they don't always have 
that, so a lot of times we'll say, 'Okay we're just going to de-escalate you today, 
give you some things you need to do in the next five or six hours, but tomorrow 
we're going to come back and give you some more information, or at least make 
sure that you've followed up with the information that we gave you yesterday' 
(Participant 10) 
 
By following-up in this manner, officers may assist in preventing a future crisis by ensuring 
that information they receive regarding community-based support is absorbed. Another 
officer suggested that even though being proactive may be ‘working upstream’, it results 
in more appropriate intervention, addresses the root causes for why certain individuals with 
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mental illness may engage in chronic calls for police service, and reduces the need for 
hospital visits for individuals who can be safely supported in the community:  
We also want to work more proactively, so working upstream. We want to have 
that person not have to have a crisis and have a police officer respond, but rather 
have community services step in and intervene more appropriately. By working 
together with community partners, we also help to address our calls for service that 
may be repeat calls for service that are not addressing the root causes, the root 
issues, for that particular call […] But the other thing that we acknowledge is that 
we are also affecting health in a positive way because that person would have [a] 
high number of admissions to hospital, visits to the emergency department, and by 
working together we help to reduce those as well (Participant 8) 
 
Reducing Police Intervention and Hospital Transfers. The third and final theme 
related to the objectives of specialized mental health responses is – as alluded to within the 
above quote – reducing police interventions and hospital visits, primarily to preserve police 
resources and to conserve time by freeing “… up our members from spending hours in an 
emergency department unnecessarily” as Participant 7 put it. For instance, part of the 
objective of the specialized response in Brockville, ON is to “… reduce unwanted, or 
negative police interactions that are traditionally a heavy drain on police recourses”; 
whereas an interview participant indicated that they address ‘nuisance calls’ from 
individuals not in crisis by connecting them with community-based mental health teams: 
I have clients that maybe haven't reached crisis point in the community, but are 
creating what we typically refer to as, more like, kind of 'nuisance calls'. They might 
call us because they are delusional about people stalking them, or breaking into 
their house – chronically schizophrenic, paranoid kind of type, and just not taking 
medication. So, some of those folks you might get two or three calls a day from 
them, there isn't a crisis, but it's a use of police resources that could be better used 
other places. So, for those clients we try and connect them with mental health teams 
so that they have better follow up, and they have a reduction in their mental health 
symptoms, therefore, a reduction in police calls moving forward (Participant 5) 
 
Consequently, hospital visits are also reduced either due to the reduction in police 
intervention through supporting PMI in the community, or by appropriately only 
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transferring those to hospital that require it. For example, part of the objective in Brantford, 
ON is that, “Not every person in crisis needs to be taken to the hospital. The MCRRT team 
helps divert [the] individual from the hospital and find [a] more appropriate supporting 
agency in the community. This in turn assists the hospital with the volume in their 
emergency room.” Similarly, the objective in Windsor, ON heavily emphasizes emergency 
department alternatives as well:  
Our team is there to lower the amount of mental health calls for front line officers 
and lower the amount of visits to the emergency department. This is a 
system/community issue not just a police issue therefore this partnership [with 
COAST] has expanded to educating our officers and other services providers with 
respect to the resources available other than the emergency department… 
 
An interviewee from another service echoed that of Brantford, ON and Windsor, ON:  
… the goal was to reduce the amount of time police were spending at hospitals with 
mental health apprehensions, and also to reduce the number of presentations at the 
emergency wards with people who may not necessarily be suitable for a mental 
health apprehension. But because the police [did] not really having any other 
mechanisms – or necessarily the right level of expertise – [they] were perhaps 
apprehending people and maybe they shouldn't have been and taking them up to 
the hospital (Participant 9) 
 
 In sum, the participating police services have indicated a variety of goals and 
objectives (Table 4), many of which surround three of the aforementioned themes. As will 
be highlighted in the following section, many of the specialized mental health responses 
have experienced significant successes in assisting the mental health population within 
their jurisdictions, but have also experienced some challenges which may hinder their 
ability to achieve their goals and objectives. 
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Successes and Challenges of Mental Health Policing in Canada 
Successes 
 Interview participants identified a variety of successes with respect to mental health 
policing not only at their respective service, but nationwide as well. These successes 
include better outcomes for those with mental illness who have an interaction with the 
police, as well as the implementation of specialized mental health responses themselves.  
Better Outcomes. In a general sense, participants indicated that police officers are 
becoming better at interacting with those who have issues surrounding mental health, and 
consequently, interactions have resulted in better outcomes for PMI. For instance, one 
participant indicates that frontline officers in their jurisdiction have increasingly utilized 
other options to help individuals of this population: 
… we're probably having better outcomes now […] Patrol has been doing immense 
work. I inundate them with all kinds of new information all the time. And I'm seeing 
more, and more files now where people are incorporating, 'We did a referral here, 
or we transported them there', and that's really encouraging for me to see because 
that patrol member is kind of listening to what's available in the community, and 
finding value in connecting folks so that we don't have these repeat occurrences 
(Participant 5) 
Another officer from another service echoed a similar thought, and alluded to that officers 
exercise patience and understanding now in comparison to what occurred ‘back in the day’: 
Well, I think, for the most part, our frontline officers are better equipped to deal 
with them than we were back in the day. I've been policing for almost 30 years now. 
So, any mental health training I got, we got at the calls. We weren't trained in mental 
health and recognition of signs and symptoms or even possible resolutions to them. 
We just, for the most part, dragged people to the hospital every single time, and the 
hospital sometimes had the capacity to hold the people and sometimes they didn't. 
We do a much better job at recognizing symptoms of mental health […] 'This 
person is suffering from mental health. It's obvious they're not listening to what I'm 
telling them what to do, so that's why they're not doing what I'm telling them to do. 
And I'm not going to get upset about that and use force, or even deadly force 
possibly, and come to some kind of better resolution where we'll at least be able to 
get them into some treatment' (Participant 10) 
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Implementation of Specialized Mental Health Responses. Other officers added 
that the implementation of specialized mental health responses, or even simply an officer 
in a mental health role, has enabled their service to further assist PMI who require 
assistance. For example, one officer describes how their role has been able to dedicate time 
to help PMI: 
… the creation of mental health positions within police departments has helped us 
to have enough time – like in my job, I have a client load of 110 people. That's 
completely unmanageable from a very detailed-oriented perspective, but at least it 
gives me enough time that I'm not taking patrol calls – I'm not a slave to the radio 
– so that I can actually focus on more case management. And having a dedicated 
person is really beneficial to that effect, because there is no way I can do this work, 
while taking patrol calls and working on the road. It would be impossible 
(Participant 5) 
 
Another officer highlights how specialized responses assist in actually getting help for 
PMI, as opposed to tying up police resources: 
… these mental health crisis teams, I think are beneficial when you have them 
because it takes that load off of the patrol officers a little bit more, and the benefit 
of that is that also helps the triage of the patient a lot quicker […] You know, you 
could be tied up, and the problem is, it's ongoing where your members could be tied 
up for hours and hours at the emergency only for the person to be released. So, 
there's a lot of frustration and a lot of, you know, resources that were being tied up 
needlessly quite frankly. So, these crisis teams, these integrated crisis teams, can 
triage quicker and try to get them the help that they need versus sitting with them 
for hours, and hours, and hours tying up resources (Participant 1) 
Alternatively, participants have identified that some jurisdictions which do not have the 
funds or resources to implement a specialized response, but realize that they require a 
different approach to addressing mental health calls, may compose an altered response that 
fits within their resourcing or funding constraints: 
You have to come up with a scalable model that works for your department. I know 
one location, they didn't have the ability to have a full time mental health nurse, but 
they rotated with having a pager, and when a call came in, if they could get to the 
scene, they would. If they couldn't, they could go to the hospital and meet them at 
the hospital, or sometimes they could come to cells and find out in the morning… 
(Participant 2) 
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Successes of Specialized Mental Health Responses. Moreover, specifically with 
respect to specialized responses, 13 of the 17 services with a specialized response identified 
a variety of factors which are crucial to their success. The predominant factor identified by 
nine services (69%) was partnerships with health and community-based services; having 
the right officers who are interested in the response was the second most common factor 
identified by four services (31%); training as well as funding/resources were each 
identified by three services (23%); establishing rapport with PMI was identified as a factor 
by two services (15%); and finally, other, less prominent factors such as 
training/supporting frontline officers, support from upper management, and availability, 
among others, were each identified as factors by a single service (7.7%).  
However, achieved successes which specifically pertained to, and resulted from, 
the use of these responses were identified as inter-agency cooperation and community-
based referrals, awareness of mental health, helping frontline, decriminalization, and trust 
between the police and those in the interaction. 
Inter-Agency Cooperation and Community-Based Diversion. As noted above, 
collaboration and partnerships with services, such as health and community-based mental 
health services, is seen as a crucial factor for success of a specialized response. One officer 
emphasizes the importance and realization that the mental health system and the police 
cannot function without one another with respect to mental health: 
The health authority, with respect to mental health, cannot function without police, 
and certainly police cannot function without mental health teams. So, we need to 
work together – collaboratively. The criminal justice system is not a place for these 
folks to go, the criminal justice system is not equipped to deal with these people, 
jail is not the answer for these people. They do not get treatment in prison, they get 
victimized in prison, [and] they get brought out of prison without any plans in place 
whatsoever – it just lands them right back on the street, and the whole revolving 
door starts all over again (Participant 9) 
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Such partnerships can ultimately result in community-based referrals or plans where people 
are assisted in the community as opposed to taken to the hospital. For instance, this officer 
discusses how diversions away from the hospital has pleased the hospital staff: 
The diversions from our emergency department, just those numbers alone, have 
impressed the psychiatry and the emergency staff, because we keep track of who 
we've diverted – like who we would have normally taken or who police would have 
taken – but [the co-response] was able to get them to their doctor… (Participant 6) 
In addition, the same officers also expands on how their response’s partnership with a 
housing program which focuses on helping those with complex needs – including mental 
health – has increased the quality of life for these individuals: 
We also work with the housing program for people that are chronically homeless, 
and also live with mental health and addictions – a series of complex needs – and 
get them into a housing-first model, and then that brings down the calls for service 
and brings down the use of all of the services. But more importantly, that person 
has a better quality of life. They might not be cured of their addiction, but at least 
if you put them into a harm reduction model they're doing less damage to 
themselves, and their chances of exposure are probably way less as they've got a 
warm bed to sleep at night. […] We had three males – well four, there was a fourth 
one – all have been housed, and our calls for service for those calls has dropped by 
hundreds – by hundreds. So, it's quite amazing (Participant 6) 
Furthermore, as identified by another officer, calls for service can be decreased, 
particularly those calls for service that originate from chronic callers, by working with 
community partners to establish plans: 
One of the huge areas we've had a lot of success is with people in the past who were 
generating hundreds and hundreds of calls. So, the repeat, chronic callers. The 
ability to put in place an effective plan, with community partners, that has all but 
eliminated, or reduced, sometimes call loads by 90-95%. So, big impacts from 
people generating 300 calls one year to generating one call the next year for just 
putting an integrated plan in place (Participant 4) 
In sum, inter-agency partnerships help establish a coordinated response, which ultimately 
provides a better understanding of those who may require help:  
You have people with expertise, the psychiatric nurses, and connection to the 
psychiatrist, and Community Services. So, there's better linkages there. Better 
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understanding of the clients because we can paint the picture with our police 
information and health information, so we have a better response to that person's 
individual needs, because you understand them better (Participant 8) 
Also, inter-agency partnerships help foster a client-centred, community-based response as 
opposed to a reactive response, even though these specialized responses can react to a crisis 
when required:  
To me it's a client-centered approach. Policing traditionally is incident driven, 
'Here's an incident, boom. We deal with it, and we're done', and the focus isn't so 
much on the person. This is more person focused, it's more community-focused, 
it's, 'How can we stabilize this person in the community? To get them the help that 
they need?'. So, it's client-centered, and that client-centered approach is likely to 
reduce the recidivism with the same member, either in criminal conduct or 
community disorder because of their crisis (Participant 7) 
 
Mental Health Awareness. Another success of specialized mental health responses 
is with respect to how mental health awareness, as well as officers’ own mental health, has 
grown in recent years. For instance, this officer states that because of the creation of the 
specialized response, other officers have come into her office to get help with their own 
mental health: 
… a big spinoff of [the co-response] that we didn't see coming – while I sort of did 
but didn't – was just our members. Our members that will come in the door and shut 
the door, and just say, 'I'm having a rough go. Who can I call about this?'. We have 
a program here that's 100% thorough and wonderful, and the people can go there 
too, but I think sometimes they feel trusting of who's in our office, and just at that 
time you need to just unwind and talk to somebody. So, since people know that I 
do this work, even when I was back as the resource officer for schools, people still 
came into my office and say, 'This is what I'm experiencing' (Participant 6) 
 
 Helping Frontline. Helping frontline officers has also been a success experienced 
by services who have a specialized response. For example, this officer believes that they 
have brought down the frustration for frontline by addressing and helping with mental 
health related calls:  
I think that we've brought some of the frustration down for Frontline, because we've 
been able to go to a call and say, 'You know what? We'll take Mr. Joe here, we'll 
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look after him, and you're free to clear'. So that really does help people. Even 
consulting over the phone and helping people make decisions on what to do next 
with a call with somebody (Participant 6) 
Similarly, another officer indicates that the specialized response as his service helps train 
the frontline:  
Presentations training, so just by our, either own personal training or just 
throughout volume of experience dealing with primarily mental health crisis 
situations, all day, every day, we're able to pass that on to training - to patrol 
officers, either short duration or full day training days (Participant 4) 
Decriminalization. Moreover, another officer highlights that a success of not only 
his specialized response, but specialized responses across Canada, is that they push the 
understanding that the criminal justice system is not the correct place for individuals with 
mental illness:  
I think some of the more positive benefits that we are having across the country is, 
as leaders in pushing the concept that the criminal justice system is not the right 
place for these people, and working collaboratively with the health teams to 
mitigate some of the challenges that they have (Participant 9) 
Another participant discusses that their specialized response also assists Crown Council in 
their jurisdiction by providing information which can assist in constructing a court-
structured strategy to help manage the individual: 
… risk reduction to the community by partnering with Crown Council and local 
mental health teams, so individuals that are arrested who have significant mental 
health issues, but have also committed a violent crime, being able to provide Crown 
Council with a background from all of the police contacts and gathering 
information from the hospital and mental health partners, and putting all of that 
information forward to the courts, they're able to better come up with a court-
structured strategy to manage that person (Participant 4) 
 
Trust. The final theme discussed by participants with respect to successes of 
specialized responses is trust that is established between the officers on the response and 
those who come into contact with those officers, as discussed by one officer:  
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I think the biggest benefit that I see is there is more of a trust in the community with 
the people that we're working with. They phone us, they interact with us, they stop 
by the station to talk to us, they're people that said they hated police and would 
never... If they've had a bad experience, and then they've had been treated well, or 
with respect and dignity, they're more likely to call (Participant 6) 
 In sum, mental health policing in Canada, as well as the use of specialized mental 
health responses, have exhibited a significant amount of success which not only assists the 
police in improving interactions with this population, but also assists members of this 
population to receive care that they may require. Unfortunately, there are still a significant 
amount of challenges endured by Canadian police, as well as specialized responses, in the 
context of policing PMI. 
Challenges 
Participants identified a variety of challenges with respect to mental health policing 
in Canada. These challenges pertain to both frontline mental health policing, as well as 
specialized mental health responses, and include high calls for service and chronic 
interactions with PMI, a lack of social supports and resources for those with mental illness, 
as well as challenges that Canadian law enforcement face internally with respect to policing 
PMI.  
Calls for Service and Chronic Interactions. Akin to the reasons for implementing 
a specialized response, one of the first challenges identified by participants with respect to 
policing PMI in Canada was the issue that this population generates a high number of calls 
for service, which, as identified by this officer, can take a significant amount of time: 
I think the challenges are that these calls for service are going up. I know they 
always say, 'crime is going down', 'your file count is going down', and 'crimes, etc.' 
but it seems as though the mental health component is going up. And the reality is, 
these calls do take some time, so it could be, from start to end, four hours – you've 
gone, you've done this, and you've got the information, and you've driven into 
[city], and you wait around, and you come back (Participant 2) 
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Another officer echoed the same issue by indicating that mental illness can potentially 
account for a large portion of a service’s calls: 
… we are dealing with an increasing number of disturbance calls involving mental 
health crisis, suicidal persons, [which] are certainly trending up. If you look across 
Canada, I've heard reports that police are dealing with someone in a mental health 
crisis – or where mental health is at least a factor – in as low as 5% and as high as 
20% of calls. So, if you look at a service like [service name] who had almost 80,000 
calls for service last year, if we're on the high-end we're looking at 16,000 calls? 
Potentially? If you looked at the 20% (Participant 7) 
 In addition to high calls for service from this population, there is the related issue 
of chronic calls from the same person, or group of people, which adds to the high number 
of calls for service. This officer describes how his service had an interaction with the same 
person 23 times in one year, leading to frustration for officers: 
… you're dealing with the same person – or people – over a period of time. So, 
there's a lot of frustration in trying to get… I'll give you an example. There's one 
particular person here that we've dealt with 23 times this past year […] It was the 
frustration of having to detain them under the involuntary psychiatric treatment act, 
[and] taking them to the hospital only for them to be released and go back to, you 
know, say, the bridge in [city] […] and some of the people were successful in 
committing suicide after the fact (Participant 1) 
 
Similarly, another officer believes that there are two sides of the mental health population 
– those who engage with the help being offered to them, and those who refuse to engage 
with any help and consequently cause several hundred calls for service in one year because 
there is no one else who can respond to them: 
The people who are experiencing mental illness in the community, those who want 
to engage with the help that are being offered them, I think for the most part do a 
pretty good job of coping in society […] And then there are those who have no 
insight into their mental illness and/or refuse to engage in any course of treatment, 
or take their medications as prescribed – just refuse to engage in any help that is 
being provided. Those are the ones that we’re left to deal with as the police because 
they refused to engage, they will not get better, they remain as sick or become more 
sick as time goes by, and then we're left to deal with that population because the 
community resources don't have the people, the will, and the resources to chase 
these people down and constantly stay on top of them […] So, the police are left to 
deal with those people. So there's a sort of two-sided – or two aisles of population 
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– the ones that want to get help and do a pretty good job – […] and there's that 
population that we see sometimes 150 times, 200 times a year (Participant 10) 
 
High and chronic calls for service can be further exacerbated within jurisdictions 
which have a high transient population. For example, this officer indicates how his 
jurisdiction can have far more people than what the service is staffed for:  
We're a core city, so unfortunately, we're staffed as a police department to deal with 
10,000 people […] but the trouble is we are a core city, so at any given time we can 
have 17,000 people in our town, and that's people with and without mental illness. 
So, we are dealing with more than our share of calls (Participant 3) 
Consequently, because the transient population is not within the same jurisdiction at all 
times, officers indicate that it is difficult to care for these individuals who may be in the 
jurisdiction of one health authority and police service one day, and in the jurisdiction of 
another health authority and police service another day: “… the integration and 
collaboration among, you know, people that move from one area to another area, or they're 
back and forth, they live in a couple different places, and how to share care for those 
individuals. That's challenging” (Participant 8). Another officer from another jurisdiction 
echoes the same challenge: 
… We just recently got this train here, so it's rapid transit, so we are seeing a bit of 
a shift with a more transient population because we're within half an hour of 
[location]. So, we are seeing some more clientele in that regard, but typically in 
[city], they are repeat clients for us. That's really when my job comes in more 
successfully to – hopefully – have the amount of time to connect them more 
properly with social services, and just do more intensive follow-up. Were able to 
do that with our regular population in [city], very challenging to do with our 
transient folks who are here today, not here tomorrow… (Participant 5) 
 
Lack of Social Supports and Resources. The high and chronic calls for service 
may be even further exacerbated in jurisdictions which lack social supports and resources 
for people with mental illness. When survey participants were asked whether they agreed 
that there were adequate mental health services within their jurisdiction, only four services 
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(17.4%) (Vancouver, BC; Brockville, ON; Chatham-Kent, ON; Peel Region) either agreed 
or strongly agreed; four services (17.4%) (Winnipeg, MB; St. Thomas, ON; York Region, 
ON; Saskatoon, SK) neither agreed nor disagreed, and the remaining 15 services (65.2%) 
either disagreed or strongly disagreed that there were adequate mental health services 
within their jurisdiction. 
Those that neither agreed nor disagreed, or either disagreed and strongly disagreed, 
further elaborated on the consequences of inadequate mental health services8. These 
services identified that inadequate mental health services can result in an increased police 
demand (n = 7; 41.2%), less appropriate care (n = 6; 35.3%), lack of/no options for help 
this population (n = 5; 29.4%), a strain on the community and police resources (n = 3; 
18%), homelessness and substance abuse (n = 3; 18%), long hospital wait times (n = 2; 
12%), negative interactions (e.g., tragic use of force) (n = 2; 12%), and criminalization (n 
= 1; 6%). 
Many of these consequences are faced by participants of this study. For example, 
one officer discussed the limited room available at the local hospital, which can become an 
issue when faced with high call volumes that result in subsequent apprehensions: “There's 
only one room at the hospital, and it's not uncommon for us to pick up one and be dealing 
with him at the hospital and go out and grab another one and come up to the hospital and 
they don't have space. That's difficult” (Participant 3). In another jurisdiction, officers at 
times have to drive to another hospital in another city because the local hospital may be 
unequipped to handle certain patients: 
We do have a hospital locally here – [name of hospital] – however, they are a 
smaller community-based hospital, and they're not set up... They would probably 
                                                 
8 The response rate for this question was 89.5% (n = 17) 
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be fine with the 'no flight risk' cooperative suicidal individual, but someone in a 
drug-induced psychosis, etc., etc., they don't have a lot of facilities, and simply don't 
have the staff to work around that. They're not what we consider 'designated', so we 
do drive to a different city, to a larger hospital facility [where] they are equipped 
for it (Participant 5) 
 
However, this challenge does not appear to be unique as this officer indicates that their 
local hospital is reluctant to accept certain individuals as well: 
Certainty a lot we're seeing are mixed mental illness diagnosis mixed with drug use, 
specifically a lot of crystal methamphetamine, causing psychosis, and the hospitals 
are reluctant to admit those patients who've used drugs, even if there does appear 
to be other underlying issues. So that population of mixed mental health and drug 
using (Participant 4) 
Transport to hospitals can also result in an additional challenge of long wait times 
before the individual is admitted or let go. Of the 23 services who participated in this study, 
only six (26%) (Nelson, BC; Brantford, ON; Durham Region, ON; Windsor, ON; 
Charlottetown, PEI; Mont-Tremblant, QC) indicated that their hospital wait time is an hour 
or less. Three services (13%) (Annapolis Royal, NS; Peel Region, ON; Regina, SK) 
indicated their wait was between four to five hours; one service (4%) (Winnipeg, MB) 
indicated their wait was more than five hours; whereas the remaining 13 services (57%) 
indicated that on average, their hospital wait times are between two to three hours. 
Furthermore, a lack of resources or community-based mental health services can 
also leave PMI, particularly those who do not meet the criteria for a mental health act 
apprehension, stuck with nowhere to go: 
P: We have one shelter that's in the jurisdiction over, and if it's reached capacity, 
they'll be obviously turning people away. So, say if we're looking for basic 
need/light housing, we're pretty much hooped for people. So, stuff like that is 
difficult. So, resourcing can be really tough to assist folks, especially if they’re not 
meeting that criteria for an apprehension under the mental health act, in which case, 
then it's kind of the hospital’s responsibility from the social services side. But if 
they're not apprehendable, then it's like, 'Okay, what are we doing to assist this 
person such that in an hour from now, they are not in the same crisis?', and 
sometimes there is very little that can be done for folks 
CIT AND CO-RESPONSE IN CANADA 
 
87 
I: What do you do in that situation? When they can't be apprehended but there’s a 
lack of options? They are kind of stuck in the middle 
P: Yeah, and that's unfortunately exactly it. Sometimes if there is no place like 
shelters, or friends, or anything that people are able to transport to – because that 
can be a reality – sometimes it's transporting them just to a Tim Hortons and literally 
buying them a coffee out of our own pockets just so they can stay warm for the 
night. These are poor solutions for a global problem. And they are very temporary 
because tomorrow that same person is homeless again (Participant 5) 
This officer further added that without basic pillars, and resources which can help provide 
those pillars, it is very difficult to help stabilize individuals in the community: 
… if I think of my sickest folks, and people who have done well, and those still 
struggling to do well – the ones that aren't doing well are the ones that are 
chronically homeless or constantly evicted from their place of residence. When you 
don't have that simple stability, or your basic pillars, right? Your nutritional needs, 
your housing needs, all those things. How do we expect someone to comply with 
mental health treatment? That's just completely unrealistic, so until we address 
those kinds of major issues, very difficult, I think, to stabilize folks in the 
community (Participant 5) 
Whereas with respect to those who cannot be stabilized in the community, particularly due 
to reasons pertaining to the individual and not resources, another officer believes that the 
‘pendulum’ post-institutionalization has swung too far leaving those who cannot be 
managed in the community without access to involuntary treatment facilities: 
One thing we have learned – that I have learned –  over the years is that despite 
everybody's best efforts, there still continues to be the population of individuals 
who, I think, just simply cannot be managed in the community[…]  Some of it 
comes down to money, [but] some of it also comes down to some philosophical 
applications in the different national and provincial health authorities, where just 
this idea that 20 years ago – 25 years ago – people were being locked up in mental 
health institutions, and in some cases maybe not appropriately so […] I think this 
pendulum had swung so far in one direction and all of a sudden there was a whole 
scale swing of the pendulum back the other way, and so now the lack of facilities 
to be able to have involuntary, secure mental health facilities where people can be 
treated are very few and far between (Participant 9)  
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Moreover, availability of those from the mental health system can be a challenge 
as well. This challenge can be faced by police services where mental health specialists do 
not have the flexibility to attend a call if needed:  
Often the mental health clinicians don't have work issued cellphones, so they're 
desk line only, and they're often tied up in appointments. Their often on a pre-
scheduled full day of cases so they don't have flexibility to just leave the office and 
go do a crisis response or outreach response (Participant 4) 
Similarly, availability can be a challenge faced by PMI who require psychiatry as wait 
times can be very long and, at times, can result in chronic calls for service: 
I know wait times for psychiatry help... I mean, they base it, I guess, to a certain 
extent on the severity of the situations that people are dealing with, but sometimes 
people are waiting for six, eight months, or a year to see a psychiatrist. And that's, 
for the most part, I would say unacceptable because we see them maybe 20, or 30, 
or 100 times before they even get to the psychiatrist because they're not getting 
the help that they need (Participant 10)  
Another officer states that their specialized response does have access to a psychiatrist 
through the local health authority, but the psychiatrist is not available when they are needed 
by officers of the response: 
… that office has a psychiatrist that we have access to for a couple hours a day 
where we can slot in appointments, and we can take people there on emergency 
basis. But our problem is, it's always booked up, we can never get in because all 
these teams have that same access. That's our biggest barrier – is no access to 
psychiatry when we need it (Participant 6) 
 
Standardization of Police Approaches to Mental Health. In addition to mental 
health resource issues that are challenging for Canadian police services when attempting 
to PMI, some interview participants have also identified that there is little standardization 
with respect to mental health approaches and training for Canadian police officers. For 
example, this officer suggests that national strategies, such as the one put forth by the 
Mental Health Commission of Canada, should be mandated and could be tailored to 
community needs: 
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The Mental Health Commission of Canada put forward a mental health strategy, 
but it's a strategy that's not binding, it's just a 'this would be ideal', but it's not 
something that says, 'you are mandated to do this', and of course that's tied in to 
funding […] But I think if there was like a national strategy that was mandated, if 
we had provincial strategies, if there was kind of a more as much of a standardized 
approach would be great, even though those approaches would have to be tailored 
to each community for the specific needs for that jurisdiction. I think those kinds 
of things would be important (Participant 8) 
Another officer also echoes the same view – standardization which is tailored for each 
community: 
Maybe it's one person fulfilling a variety of roles, or in larger urban centres, those 
roles are more clearly separated and defined. But either way, some sort of 
standardization as far as ‘each community will provide a collaborative, specialized 
mental health response. And, in order to do so, that response will consist of...’ Even 
if it's a police officer that has... You know, is just a regular 911 in a rural officer, or 
in a big city with 10 specialized mental health officers, that they will receive 
training... Additional training in crisis communication, de-escalation... They will 
receive additional training in signs, symptoms, awareness, suicide, risk assessment 
intervention, and... Yeah, those are sort of the key ones. So, standardization, 
regardless of the size and scope of the program. Some sort of standardization 
(Participant 4) 
 
Furthermore, another officer suggests using Coleman & Cotton’s (2014) TEMPO model – 
discussed within Chapter Two – as a guideline for standards, but admits that governing the 
standards nationwide may also pose as a challenge: 
There was a report done by Terry Coleman and Dorothy Cotton a couple years 
back, you might be familiar with it, where they talked about TEMPO 1, TEMPO 2, 
TEMPO 3. I think that they've hit the mark, like that's accurate. But there's no way 
to govern that. There is no way to go across Canada and say, 'Are your officers a 
TEMPO 300?’. But when I relay to my management the qualifications I think that 
we need here, I refer to that document, because to me it's got some weight, it's got 
my thoughts too. It gives at least a guideline for standards. So, I think that that's 
one of the things that needs to be worked on is sort of a governance of standards, 
or an overseeing (Participant 6) 
 
Challenges of Specialized Mental Health Responses. Participants also identified 
challenges which specifically pertained to the use of specialized mental health responses, 
such as hours of operation, large jurisdictions, documentation, staffing and funding for 
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specialized responses, sharing best practices and evidence-base, as well as a lack of 
understanding and misunderstanding with respect to specialized responses. 
Hours of Operation. Certain officers indicated that the hours of operation of their 
specialized response results in no coverage at certain times, or even certain days. This 
officer indicated that if they receive a call at a certain time, frontline is responsible for the 
call: “So if we have a call at [time], there's no mental health team available – the officers 
are responsible for taking care of that themselves. It would be nice to have 24-hour 
availability – more teams available” (Participant 10). Similarly, this officer echo’s the same 
challenge, but adds that the response is needed more so at certain times and that there are 
contractual considerations which must be respected in terms of equal work hours for 
officers of the specialized response: 
… we only have coverage 40% of the time. We don't always have the cover-off 
officers available or cover-off crisis worker. We have these guys – at least on the 
patrol side – work a day and a night […] They work a day and a night with each 
one, so they're not always available 24/7. We've constructed their hours so that, 
when we did an analysis of the calls, their night shifts are [time] to [time], and their 
day shifts are [time] to [time]. And we kind of did that with the sense of, ‘when are 
they needed?’ But then there's also some contractual considerations that we have to 
do in terms of an equal amount of nights and days, and all of those kind of things 
(Participant 7) 
 
Contrastingly, another officer was unsatisfied with the hours that his specialized response 
worked, and as a result, conducted an analysis to determine which hours would be best for 
their jurisdiction – the attempt at changing the hours was unsuccessful: 
… they only work [time] to [time] and [day] to [day] […] I had done a breakdown 
of all our calls, and we found that if they worked […] from [time] to [time] and 
somebody else from [time] to [time] – if they worked just till [time] […], they 
would get 50% more mental health calls. And, they just, like... No, it didn't matter 
(Participant 3) 
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Large Jurisdiction. Another challenge indicated by some officers was the size of 
their jurisdiction. For instance, this officer believes “The geography is a big piece. We've 
got a [number] square kilometer region where we have [a response] available in the south 
end and [a response] in the north end, so we can't make all the calls” (Participant 10). 
Similarly, another officer believes that their service’s investment into their specialized 
response is not as good as they expect due to the size of their jurisdiction:  
We're currently reviewing it right now [the specialized response]. I'm not convinced 
our investment in that right now is as good as it should be. I think the jurisdiction 
is too big. I don't think we're getting a level of service from the crisis response team 
that we need. I think the service needs to be expanded, and so we're currently in 
partnership with the health authority here looking at how we might be able to 
expand that service (Participant 9) 
 
Documentation. As mentioned by Participant 10, a large jurisdiction can lead to 
the specialized response not getting to all calls. This issue can also be further exacerbated 
by documentation, which can take up large periods of time for specialized responses. This 
officer states that those on their specialized response have to finish paperwork regarding 
one call before they can move on to another, otherwise they would have to take a day off 
to catch up on paperwork:  
For every hour you spend with one person, you probably spend two hours [on] 
documentation. [The health authority] added a couple more things on to our 
clinician that makes it a little bit more complicated. So, you can't really move on 
from one call to the next, or stack up a whole bunch of calls, and then do the 
documentation all at the end, because then you'd be out of commission for a day 
(Participant 6) 
 
Staffing and Funding for Responses. Another challenge identified by participants 
is staffing and funding for specialized responses. One officer stated that their response 
cannot get to certain people “… because we just don’t have the manpower” (Participant 6). 
Another officer highlights that a lack of staffing, because of a colleague being off with a 
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health issue, has increased demand on other officers who are part of the specialized 
response:  
Certainly staffing […] Especially with my colleague off with a health injury over 
the past six months […] So demand from […] patrol officers as they're responding 
real-time to calls in crisis, with calls from all of the different mental health workers, 
teams, housing agencies, hospital workers, social workers looking for advice or 
police information to support their discharge or case plan with somebody, wanting 
to know whether there are recent police events or any concerns. So just staffing, 
and ability to respond to sort of all of the requests… (Participant 4) 
In another jurisdiction, the officer states that management realizes that they could expand 
their specialized response, but do not have the resources to do so: 
I think management really recognizes that we could expand it […], but resourcing 
wise, we just don't have the budget – or anything – to support that at that time. I 
think there's recognition we could be having a couple more people up here, but 
within the same sense we're limited within what we get funded for officer positions 
from the city (Participant 5) 
 
Lack of Understanding and Misunderstanding. A lack of understanding from 
management was also identified as a challenge by a participant. This officer acknowledges 
that they were fortunate with good management, but stresses that other jurisdictions may 
not be as fortunate, and may have management which may want to criminalize mental 
health:  
… [a] lack of understanding from management about what needs to happen. I think 
frontlines see it, but sometimes management might not. I'm that fortunate that I had 
a string of management that did see things clearly, and that our Police Board of 
Commissioners also fought to keep, and expand, the [specialized response]. So, I 
think for some areas that might be a barrier. There's [still] too much thinking that 
you punish addictions and you punish mental health because it's their own fault that 
they are this way. I think that lack of an education, and lack of understanding, and 
lack of empathy towards the illnesses and disorders that govern some of the 
decisions that are made. I think that's probably the biggest one, because the stigma 
is still there (Participant 6) 
The same officer also highlights that some may not understand what a specialized response 
does, or expect the response to do things outside of their mandate: 
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Sometimes another barrier is […] misunderstandings of what we do, and people 
expecting us to do things that aren't within our mandate, or the perception that we 
can just come and fix things. Something's that's taken 20 years... Couple decades of 
dysfunction and they call the [specialized response], and then they'll say to us later, 
'Well, you guys already... Why is this still happening?'. Well, we don't have a magic 
wand – that's the line I use, I go, 'You know, I wish I did have a magic wand, but 
it's broken today, so we're going to have to work with these...' (Participant 6) 
  
Sharing Best Practices and Evidence Base. The final specialized-response-
specific challenge identified by participants was with respect to sharing best practices on 
these responses. For example, this officer stresses that police agencies have to do a better 
job at sharing their successes: 
... we need to exploit those best practices in the sense of those integrated teams, or 
systems that work better with better triaging at hospitals, and what has been done. 
So, if we come up with something that's great in [city], or something that's been 
great in [location], well then that should be shared. So, I think we need to do a better 
job of communicating those successes and those best practices across the province 
(Participant 2) 
Another officer, before establishing their specialized response, attempted to look for any 
available data from other jurisdictions and was unable to find much – this officer’s service 
ultimately employed a pilot study which was deemed successful: 
So, what we did, is we looked at any available data that we could get in the policing 
world, and quite frankly, police services aren't very good at sharing their data or 
some of their programs, at least not in a peer-reviewed sense. So, sometimes it's a 
little bit more difficult to... And we don't publish them typically, so it's tough to 
dive down and get reports and data because they're not readily available. So, long 
story short is, we did our own pilot. It was a very successful pilot (Participant 7) 
 Moreover, the same officer also further suggested that police agencies typically buy 
into a new program without setting up metrics on how to evaluate the program to ensure 
effectiveness – this officer especially stressed that effectiveness is crucial as a publicly-
funded agency to make sure money is being used properly or saved. This officer’s 
specialized response was able to save about half a million dollars in one year: 
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… a lot of police agencies jump in and sort of buy into a new program, but there's 
not really a lot of metrics set up. It's not a brilliant, evidence-based, a proof-of-
concept program. So, what we did is decided that we needed to have some good 
metrics, and to look at those metrics and decide on what outcomes that we would 
expect. You know, when you're a publicly-funded agency, and you enter into a new 
agreement with someone, you still have to be able to prove efficiencies – not just 
for police, but for health and so on. And we've been able to do that, either social 
return on investment, or cost avoidance […] So if we were to look at our last year 
of data it's $400,000 in emergency department diversions, [and] probably $100,000 
in arrest diversions (Participant 7) 
 
The same officer continues by saying that more research can illustrate that specialized 
responses are an evidence-based response, and thus can receive more funding: “I think 
that's why the more research and the more we can illustrate that co-response is an evidence-
based response, the more likely police agencies are able to get funding” (Participant 7). On 
a similar note, another officer believes that there has been a shift in Canadian policing 
towards evidence-based policing, however, in order to assess specialized responses, police 
will need to partner with academia: 
We really have made a shift in policing across the country, but certainly in [city] 
on evidence-based decision-making. […] Intuitively we know these teams are 
working, but until police can also determine better ways to gather the statistics, the 
data, the only way we're going to be able to do it is by partnering with academia. 
And I think therein lies another very positive relationship for police, is to partner 
with these research institutions – like yourself, who are interested in studying this 
– so that we can make sure that what we're doing actually is working, and identify 
areas where we can improve (Participant 9)  
In fact, eight (47%) of the police services who participated in this study that have a 
specialized response indicated that they would be open to having an evaluation conducted 
on their response within the near future, which is promising for the evidence base of 
Canadian research on policing those with mental illness. 
Health Issue, Not Police Issue. The final challenge identified by officers of this 
study, which applies to all of policing, not solely specialized responses, is that interactions 
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with PMI should not be a police duty. This officer suggests that police respond to mental 
health calls because other systems are failing: 
I think the onus on police – because the other systems are kind of failing, and I'm 
not saying we're the answer to everything, because I don't think we are – but we're 
just seeing more, and more, and more of it, and I think the expectations for us to 
have that background knowledge on mental health are, in part, unrealistic, right? It 
shouldn't necessarily be a traditional police role. As much as I love my job, I think 
it's been created out of a crisis point of other systems failing our folks in the 
community that aren't doing so well (Participant 5) 
 
Another officer adds that if officers are tied up with mental health calls, they cannot service 
their other citizens: 
We're not the professionals that should be dealing with this. That should be mental 
health people. The cliental are not getting the service that they should be, and that's 
no fault of ours. We do what we can with what training we have and what money 
the province provides us. The reality is we need to be funded better and so does 
mental health. They have to have some treatment facilities to deal with these 
individuals because otherwise we do. It has a real impact on our services. If we're 
tied up with a mental health call, then we're not servicing the rest of our citizens, 
and that's not fair (Participant 3) 
Another officer states that the police have been given the de-facto frontline mental health 
response because they have the capacity to have employees out at all times, and at times, 
this de-facto role can lead to tragic consequences. This officer believes that it would be 
ideal if they were ‘put out of business’ for mental health responses:  
We do get some training, but we're certainly not practitioners in mental health. We 
do the best that we can out there. Sometimes, things turn into disasters, and 
unfortunately in some instances people die as a result of it, right? Who's to say that 
it would have ended up exactly the same way if a car full of mental health workers 
had responded to it. Well, they don't have guns, and Tasers, and all those kinds of 
things. So likely not it wouldn't have happened, and they may have dealt with it 
better, and things might not have turned out the way they did. But unfortunately, 
because we're given the frontline responsibility, because there is no one else who 
can do it, right? Nobody else has the capacity to put cars on a road all day long […] 
I think if they put us out of business in mental health response, that would be ideal 
(Participant 10) 
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Similarly, another officer also argues that the capacity of the police has made them the 
agency of ‘first resort’ as those from the mental health system – who are better equipped 
to address crises – do not make house calls:  
… before 911, policing, I think, was the agency of last resort. People didn't know 
who to call when someone was in crisis. They would look up every phone number 
in the book and then they'd call police. But since 911, I'd say that we have become 
the agency of first resort. It's easy to call, you have 24 hour/7, you get a cop to show 
up at your door, and we try and help you. But we respond to these calls with not 
necessarily the appropriate tools with us, and training with us. It's not in our 
immediate wheelhouse – we're not mental health trained social workers. We are 
asked to quell crisis, but we don't necessarily have the best tools to do it, and that's 
[where] a mental health worker, a mental health nurse, a mental health crisis worker 
is probably better equipped to do that, but quite typically, they don't come to your 
house when you call (Participant 7) 
In sum, as this chapter has suggested, specialized mental health responses – 
particularly in the form of co-response – have been deployed by many of the participating 
Canadian police services and in many differing organizational structures in order to attain 
numerous goals and objectives. These responses have been able to achieve many successes, 
but unfortunately also endure many challenges, some of which may hinder potential 
success. In the chapter that follows, the above results will be discussed and 
recommendations will be provided on how to address the challenges of these responses. 
Limitations of the current study and future directions for subsequent research will be 
discussed as well.  
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Chapter Five: Limitations, Discussion, and Conclusion 
As little research has been conducted on these specialized mental health responses, 
particularly within the Canadian context, the purpose of this thesis was to survey and 
interview officers from across Canada in an attempt to answer three research questions: (1) 
Which Canadian police services employ a CIT and/or co-response; (2) what are the 
elements that make up these responses; and (3) what are the successes achieved and 
challenges faced by Canadian CIT/co-response teams. Although exploratory in nature, the 
findings of this thesis highlight several areas for future research and policy changes that 
will allow Canadian services to become better informed on these responses and how they 
could be improved. However, before discussing the findings of this thesis, certain 
limitations must be acknowledged.  
First, a low survey response rate has limited the ability to attain a full understanding 
of which Canadian police services employ a specialized response. While the expectation 
was not to achieve participation from every Canadian police service, a 22.5% response rate 
is low, but not irregular from previous policing research (e.g., Coleman & Cotton, 2010a; 
Huey et al., 2017). Second, the standardized nature of a survey methodology may have 
prevented participants from elaborating on various unforeseen aspects of their respective 
specialized mental health response, and thus a full understanding of these responses may 
have not been captured herein. Third, as identified within Chapter Four, complexities arose 
when attempting to identify which police services employ a CIT – otherwise known as the 
‘Memphis Model’ or a first responder model – where eight services identified having a 
CIT, but later in the survey described a co-response. There are three plausible sources for 
this limitation: (1) the conceptualization of CIT on the survey itself which was derived 
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from the work of Deane et al. (1999) and lacked an emphasis that CIT is a ‘first responder’ 
or ‘frontline’ approach (e.g., Dupont et al., 2007; Durbin et al., 2010b); (2) that police-
based specialized mental health response officers (i.e., co-response officers) are CIT 
trained, and are technically, as outlined in the survey, “… a group of officers who receive 
an extended amount of mental health training (typically 40 hours) and are considered the 
‘mental health crisis specialists’ of their police service”, but are in co-response positions 
as opposed to CIT positions; and (3) that the eight services who indicated having a CIT 
indeed have CIT trained frontline officers, but only elaborated on their co-response within 
the survey. The final limitation concerns the participants of this study. As noted within 
Chapter Three, participants who held mental health-related positions or were part of co-
responses were particularly sought as they would be the most informed about mental health 
policing at their police service. While these participants were extremely helpful and 
knowledgeable, their views may not be representative of all officers across Canada, 
particularly of officers who are on the frontline and may have different opinions with 
respect to PMI and mental health in contrast to an officer who is specifically in a position 
to assist this population. While this does not undermine any of the results presented herein, 
it is important to interpret them with caution, particularly data which originates from an 
interview. 
Irrespective of these limitations, however, the findings of this thesis have developed 
new and exploratory insights into the under researched area of specialized mental health 
responses used by Canadian police services. Prior research has indicated that specialized 
responses have been employed in other Canadian jurisdictions, such as Hamilton (Fahim 
et al., 2016) and Toronto (Iacobucci, 2014), for quite some time. Yet, little attention has 
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been given to these responses on a national scale. By surveying all services in Canada, this 
thesis has been able to provide a wider understanding of these responses than currently 
available within academic literature. The findings suggest that the use of specialized 
responses – specifically co-responses – for mental health calls are fairly common at the 
participating services, but largely differ in terms of structure and organization from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. These differences – such as response type, hours of operation, 
first or second response – may stem from a whole host of jurisdiction-based factors, such 
as demographics, geography, availability of community-based mental health services, 
prevalence of PMI contacts, and more (Butler, 2014; Deane et al., 1999; Durbin et al., 
2010a; Reuland et al., 2009). 
With respect to why services employed a specialized response, the answers are 
fairly similar across all services. The reasons identified are high volume and chronic calls 
mental health calls, and a realization that the police needed to improve how they address 
these calls. As co-responses are generally associated with enhanced outcomes (Iacobucci, 
2014; Kirst et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2015; Rosenbaum, 2010; Shapiro et al., 2015) it is not 
surprising that such a response was selected by the participating services in order to 
facilitate improvement and mitigate mental health calls, which are typically identified as a 
source of frustration for officers (Wells & Schafer, 2006) and a burden on police resources 
(Canadian Association of the Chiefs of Police, 2015). Similarly, the goals and objectives 
of these responses appear to interrelate with why the responses were implemented in the 
first place. These were identified as assisting PMI, supporting PMI in the community (and 
its associated factors such as collaboration with community-based resources, connecting 
PMI to these resources, proactive outreach, post-crisis follow up, case management, etc.), 
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and reducing police intervention and hospital transfers – all of which have the ability to 
improve PMI contacts and mitigate high volume and chronic calls (e.g., Bonkiewicz et al., 
2014; Fahim et al., 2016). Although these findings are new at a micro level as previous 
research has not explored the goals and objectives of specialized responses from service to 
service, these findings largely mirror the overall concept and objectives of the co-response 
model in general (Lee et al., 2015; Shapiro et al., 2015). 
Fortunately, many participants identified significant successes achieved through 
the use of their specialized responses, such as inter-agency co-operation and community-
based diversion resulting in less calls for service, mental health awareness, helping the 
frontline, decriminalization, and a building of trust between officers and PMI. Within these 
successes, as well as elsewhere in the results, we also see many factors which are indicative 
of the policing strategies discussed within Chapter Two – community policing, risk 
management, procedural justice, and evidence-based policing. Herein, many of these 
strategies are intertwined in an attempt to assist PMI who come into contact with co-
responses in Canada. For instance, through the lens of community policing, services 
establish partnerships with health authorities, mental health professionals, and community-
based mental health services in order to deploy a co-response and to forge links for PMI 
diversion into more appropriate care away from the criminal justice system or even the 
hospital. While at the scene of an interaction, officers conduct a risk assessment, in 
consultation with their co-response partner, to determine if a PMI is to be apprehended or 
diverted to community-based mental health resources. By means of the latter option, as 
well as proactive outreach and follow up, co-responses are able to forge rapport and trust 
with their PMI clients to the point where they do not fear to reach out to the co-response, 
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which, again, is suggestive of procedural justice principles. And finally, the use of 
evidence-based decision making with respect to co-response deployment, which will be 
further discussed below, was emphasized by participants who supported that more research 
be conducted on these responses. 
This evidence of intertwining policing strategies within co-response deployment in 
Canada not only contributes to the under researched area of policing literature, but also 
highlights the complex, multi-level conceptualization that certain aspects of policing may 
encompass. By utilizing such a conceptualization to operationalize and theorize about 
policing, a deeper understanding of police responses, duties, or even the institution as a 
whole may be developed. Therefore, future evaluative studies on specialized responses 
should consider this multi-level conceptualization in order to fully understand the 
intertwining strategies at play within these responses, and how the use, under development, 
or omission of one strategy affects the success of the response. 
Despite the successes, however, participants also identified many challenges faced 
by their specialized responses, some of which appear to originate internally (e.g., structure), 
while others appear to originate externally (e.g., lack of community-based mental health 
resources). Unfortunately, the identified challenges may significantly undermine the ability 
of these specialized responses to achieve their indented objectives and successes, thus these 
challenges – discussed in detail below – must be addressed through either further research 
or policy adjustments.    
  First, there appears to be a need to modify mental health training for Canadian 
police officers. While the present study did not thoroughly explore this area, prior research 
has indicated that mental health training is unstandardized and differs in terms of content 
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and length from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (Cotton & Coleman, 2008; Coleman & Cotton, 
2010a). Participants particularly identified that standardization is a challenge within 
contemporary mental health policing in Canada and suggested the need for a mandated 
national mental health strategy which could facilitate standardization, as well as 
establishing standards with respect to specialized mental health response deployment that 
may be tailored to certain jurisdictional qualities (e.g., urban and remote areas). In 
accordance with a suggestion provided by one of the participants, if a governance of 
standards – or a mandated mental health strategy – were established, Coleman & Cotton’s 
(2014) TEMPO model would be the ideal guideline for standardized mental health training 
across the country. As briefly discussed in Chapter Two, TEMPO is a tiered training 
module ranging from ‘TEMPO 100’ that is comprised of basic mental health training, up 
to ‘TEMPO 400’ which includes specialized training, such as CIT and/or co-response 
(Coleman & Cotton, 2014). Some services already employ a similar tiered module, such as 
Halifax (Appendix 1), but mandating nationwide TEMPO-like training can ensure 
consensus, from coast-to-cost, that all officers, and officers in specialized positions, are 
trained in accordance to a particular standard of training. These standards can also be 
modified for a tailored approach for certain needs and resources of a given jurisdiction. For 
example, by establishing measures – such as the average number of PMI calls and budgeted 
service funds for these calls – certain TEMPO requirements can be adjusted to incorporate 
differences in these measures, while still facilitating standardization. 
In addition, such widespread standardization may also facilitate knowledge 
improvement and attitudinal changes within policing with respect to mental health. While 
some participants indicated substantial improvement in this area, one participant suggested 
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that some frontline officers may be unaware of the duties and abilities of co-response. 
Further, the same participant identified that some services may also have management that 
prefer to criminalize mental health and mental illness, and as a result, may be less willing 
to support intervention measures such as specialized responses. Negative attitudes within 
policing towards PMI have been well documented and originate for a variety of reasons, 
namely because PMI calls are considered not to be a police matter (e.g., Iacobucci, 2014; 
Schulenberg, 2016). However, specialized responses, such as CIT, have been labeled as a 
‘log in the fire’ which have the ability to initiate positive change with respect to attitudes, 
beliefs, stigma, and the police culture (Watson et al., 2011). Therefore, TEMPO – which 
emphasizes the deployment of specialized responses – as a standardized nationwide 
module would undoubtedly have the ability to be many logs in the fire to facilitate 
knowledge generation about responses to PMI and attitudinal improvements among all 
Canadian officers.  
Second, there are issues which pertain to the structure and organization of 
specialized mental health responses. These were identified as not being in operation 24/7, 
large jurisdictions, and documentation procedures. Unfortunately, these challenges 
significantly limit the reach that co-responses are able to have because they are not able to 
respond outside of their hours of operation; large jurisdictions may be difficult to cover, 
particularly in instances with one co-response team and two simultaneous PMI calls on 
opposite sides of the jurisdiction; and exorbitant amounts of documentation may prevent 
co-responses to move on to the next PMI call if documentation from the previous call is 
incomplete. Beyond the challenges specifically identified by participants, additional 
structural challenges pulled from the results are that some services only have one co-
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response, they are a secondary response, and/or that officers are assigned to these mental 
health-specific positions. 
It is widely known that specialized responses only attend a small percentage of all 
mental health calls because of some of these aforementioned challenges (e.g., Durbin et 
al., 2010b; Iacobucci, 2014; Schulenberg, 2016; Steadman et al., 2000). However, certain 
changes can mitigate many of these challenges. For instance, establishing several co-
response teams that have 24-hour coverage would allow for greater reach at all times and 
better coverage in larger jurisdictions. Similarly, making co-responses a first response, as 
opposed to a response requested by frontline officers, would also allow for greater reach to 
PMI in need, and would also allow for the most appropriate person (i.e., mental health 
specialist) to be on the scene as quickly as possible (Iacobucci, 2014). Further, services 
should also consider making co-response positions for officers voluntary as opposed to 
assigned. CIT elements emphasize that this ensures that the most appropriate officers are 
placed in these positions (Dupont et al., 2007) which ultimately benefits PMI. Finally, 
documentation has been raised as an issue in prior studies where officers and mental health 
specialists collected different information (Kirst et al., 2014). However, herein, the amount 
of documentation appears to be the issue. Currently, software such as HealthIM (2017) has 
been developed in order to help officers of certain Canadian police services assess the risk 
factors of PMI they come into contact with, and allows them to make informed decisions 
on next steps for PMI (e.g., apprehension vs. diversion, etc.). HealthIM (2017) also allows 
for paperless recordkeeping and syncs contact data between police and hospital databases. 
Undoubtedly, adopting such a program could eliminate the need for both the officer and 
mental health specialist of a co-response team to complete documentation, consequently 
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cutting down the time spent and amount of documentation, and allowing the co-response 
to move onto the next PMI call with little delay. 
Third, and likely the most pertinent issue, is a lack of mental health resources for 
PMI. Overwhelmingly, most participants identified that there is a significant lack of 
community-based mental health resources and access to the mental health system for PMI 
within their jurisdictions. This lack of resources and access has led to not enough rooms in 
hospitals, extremely long hospital wait times for officers, no help for PMI who may require 
assistance but do not fit apprehension criteria, little or no access to psychiatry, and much 
more – all of which contribute to high calls for service and chronic interactions. In Canada, 
only 7% of all health spending is devoted to mental health (as cited in Iacobucci, 2014), 
which unfortunately contributes to the lack of resources and access to the mental health 
system for PMI. Over three decades ago, within the context of PMI criminalization in the 
United States, Teplin (1984) wrote: 
… the mentally ill must not be criminalized as a result of inadequate funding for 
the mental health system […] a long-term commitment to funding mental health 
care is required. In this way, the most appropriate and effective treatment programs 
may be provided within the least restrictive setting possible. We must make policy 
modifications and allocate the appropriate resources in order to see that the civil 
rights of the mentally ill are protected and, in doing so, provide the most humane 
and effective treatment available (p. 802)  
 
Revisiting Munetz and Griffin’s (2006) Sequential Intercept Model (Appendix 2), the 
“ultimate intercept” for diverting PMI out of the criminal justice system is an accessible 
mental health system. Yet, presently, Canadian mental health funding and resources do not 
strive too far off from what Teplin (1984) described in the American context so many years 
ago, and no indications have been made that changes to funding would occur in the near 
future – even though more funding is undoubtedly required. 
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 Because of the underfunded mental health system resulting in inadequate care and 
subsequent PMI calls for service, officers have become de-facto mental health 
professionals (Compton et al., 2014a). Consequently, to fulfill these roles, services have 
employed part of the second intercept on the Sequential Intercept Model (Munetz & 
Griffin, 2006; Appendix 2) pre-arrest diversion programs, otherwise known as CITs and/or 
co-responses. Unfortunately, some participants suggested that their specialized responses 
are also underfunded and under resourced, which may prevent any expansion and negates 
some of the aforementioned recommendations. This may be in part due to the 
understanding that addressing PMI should be a health issue, not a police issue. While no 
participants negatively interpret PMI calls as not ‘real’ police work (Coleman & Cotton, 
2010b; Iacobucci, 2014; Schulenberg, 2016), they simply believe that the police are not the 
most appropriate response to PMI and suggest that more mental health specific resources 
need to be funded and implemented in order to put the police ‘out of business’ with respect 
to responding to these calls. Therefore, it is plausible that there may be a reluctance from 
the police to spend more money and resources on an issue that they believe should be 
addressed by the mental health system, especially since PMI calls are already a burden on 
police resources. 
 Ultimately, there appears to be two underfunded approaches meant to assist PMI in 
Canada – the mental health system and resources, and specialized police responses. The 
best solution would be to increase funding for the mental health system which would result 
in better care for PMI and less police contacts; however, as this has yet to occur, even 
several decades post-de-institutionalization, this solution is unlikely. An alternate solution 
would be to increase funding for co-responses. While this may appear as an ineffective 
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solution without a properly funded mental health system and resources, or an infeasible 
solution with raising police expenditures (Conor, 2018), it is not entirely without merit. As 
suggested by participants in the previous chapter, even with the current lack of access and 
resources, the co-responses of the participating services have achieved many successes, 
namely community-based diversion and subsequent decreases in PMI calls for service. 
These successes consequently decrease the use of police resources and could undoubtedly 
be enhanced with more co-response funding. 
 While there may be some reluctance on behalf the police to fund co-responses 
because PMI contacts are not considered a police issue, the amount spent to implement or 
expand co-responses have the potential to be miniscule in contrast to the savings achieved 
through implementation or expansion. For instance, one participant indicated that through 
an evaluation on their co-response, they were able to determine that in a single year they 
were able to save $400,000 in emergency department diversions and $100,000 in arrest 
diversions. Simply reinvesting even part of the $100,000 savings by establishing more co-
responses could potentially increase these emergency department and arrest diversion 
savings. In addition, as argued by one participant, even engaging in research and 
evaluations that show such positive outcomes and cost savings can contribute to making 
co-responses an evidence-based practice, thus resulting in more co-response funding for 
police agencies. Unsurprisingly, however, herein lies the same issue that fueled the reason 
for conducting this thesis on specialized responses in Canada – there is very little research, 
especially from an evaluative perspective as most police services have established these 
responses on the premise that they are a ‘best practice’ as opposed to an effective practice 
(Coleman & Cotton, 2010a). 
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In sum, much more research on these responses in Canada is required. There are a 
plethora of areas that scholars could explore, such as whether the responses are achieving 
their intended objectives, outcomes for PMI, training for specialized officers, stigma and 
attitude changes following implementation of a specialized response, determining CIT 
deployment, assessing differences between co-response types (i.e., mental health-based vs. 
police-based), optimal structure and organization (e.g., hours of operation, first or second 
response, voluntary/assigned, etc.), specialized responses within the TEMPO module, and 
documentation practices, to name a few. While more research is not the ultimate solution 
to the challenges faced by Canadian co-responses, determining if these responses are 
indeed successful and measuring their outcomes is the best place to start. By doing so, an 
evidence base can be established with respect to these responses that can inform scholars 
and services on how to deploy effective responses and how to best address these challenges. 
In addition, evaluations which also demonstrate cost and resource savings may result in 
more funding and subsequent response expansion, thus potentially leading to even further 
cost and resource savings. However, most importantly, future research, as well as 
implementation or expansion of co-response would be most beneficial to PMI because 
research would inform services on how to effectively use these responses to the benefit of 
PMI; whereas implementation or expansion would increase the likelihood that PMI come 
into contact with a specialized team who is most knowledgeable on how to appropriately 
assist and divert them to the most appropriate resource.  
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Appendix 1: Halifax Regional Police Education and Training Matrix  
(Coleman & Cotton, 2010, pp. 15-16) 
 
Level Length / Method of Training Learning Objectives 
100 Level: Basic Police 
Training 
• 3-day training with all 
‘recruit’ classes 
• 1-day training for lateral 
hires 
• To introduce new police 
officers to broad categories 
of mental illness and mental 
health difficulties 
specifically as it relates to 
EDPs 
• To provide education on 
appropriate strategies and 
guidelines for responding to 
EDPs 
• To increase confidence, 
comfort and awareness in 
responding and resolving 
EDP presentations 
• To understand and gain 
familiarity with the HRP 
policy and procedure in 
relation to EDPs and the 
Involuntary Patient 
Treatment Act (IPTA) to 
understand the role of 
MHMCT, the service it 
provides and the 
relationship with HRP to 
introduce the MHMCT 
HRP officer triage card for 
EDPs 
200 Level: Continuing 
Education for First 
Responders 
• Three-hour training for 
police officers who have not 
received the basic training 
(Level 100) 
• Provided four days per year 
for eight separate three-hour 
sessions/year 
• Includes the CPKN on-line 
course 
• A more interactive 
presentation with the 
MHMCT is under 
consideration 
• To provide continuing 
education to police 
personnel on broad 
categories of signs and 
symptoms of mental illness 
• To provide education on 
guidelines for responding to 
and resolving EDP calls to 
increase familiarity with the 
IPTA 
• To explain the role of 
MHMCT, the service it 
provides and the 
relationship with HRP 
• To introduce the MHMCT 
HRP officer triage card for 
EDPs 
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300 Level: CIT Training • 40 hours of 
education/training 
• Delivered at least twice per 
calendar year 
• To increase awareness and 
understanding of mental 
health issues and 
particularly better 
understand the perspective 
of mental health consumers 
and their families 
• To develop and enhance the 
participants’ skills in 
interviewing and 
communicating with 
mentally ill persons referred 
to as EDPs 
• To increase the participants’ 
knowledge of the most 
common mental illnesses 
and the most appropriate 
ways to approach and deal 
with these individuals 
• To increase skills in 
communicating 
observations when 
providing report in response 
to EDP calls 
• To increase the knowledge 
of community resources to 
assist the mentally ill in the 
community, their family 
members and the police 
officers dealing with them 
• To develop knowledge, 
skills and strategies for 
police officers to safely de-
escalate a person in a 
mental health crisis 
• To increase understanding 
and knowledge of the 
MHMCT role, the IPTA 
and the relationship with 
HRP 
• To increase understanding 
of the systemic relationship 
between the Emergency 
Department, Psych 
Assessment Services and 
HRP 
400 Level: Advanced 
Training for MHMCT 
Police Officers 
• Prerequisite is successful 
completion of the 300-level 
course 
• To gain a more in depth 
working knowledge of 
mental illness:  signs and 
symptoms, strategies for 
CIT AND CO-RESPONSE IN CANADA 
 
122 
• The one week Capital 
Health Mental Health 
Orientation which is 
delivered to all new mental 
health staff 
• A minimum of four job-
shadow shifts with MHMCT 
maximizing individual and 
public safety and 
appropriate strategies for 
responding to EDP 
• To increase communication 
skills and strategies to 
respond to EDP 
• To increase skills in 
reporting observations both 
verbally and in reports 
Appendix 2: Sequential Intercept Model  
(Munetz & Griffin, 2006, p. 545) 
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Appendix 3: 40-Hour Officer CIT Comprehensive Training  
(Dupont et al., 2007, pp. 14-15) 
 
1) Didactics and Lectures/Specialized Knowledge 
• Clinical Issues Related to Mental Illnesses     
• Medications and Side Effects     
• Alcohol and Drug Assessment    
• Co-Occurring Disorders    
• Developmental Disabilities    
• Family/Consumer Perspective    
• Suicide Prevention and Practicum Aspects    
• Rights/Civil Commitment    
• Mental Health Diversity    
• Equipment Orientation    
• Policies and Procedures    
• Personality Disorders    
• Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD)    
• Legal Aspects of Officer Liability    
• Community Resources 
 
2) One-Site Visits and Exposure 
 
3) Practical Skill Training/Scenario Based 
• Crisis De-Escalation Training Part I (Basic Strategies)     
• Crisis De-Escalation Training Part II (Basic Verbal Skills)    
• Crisis De-Escalation Training Part III (Stages/Cycle of a Crisis Escalation)     
• Crisis De-Escalation Training Part IV (Advanced Verbal Skills)     
• Crisis De-Escalation Training Part V (Advanced Strategies: Complex 
Scenarios) 
 
4) Questions and Answers 
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Appendix 4: Survey & Consent Form  
 
Policing Mental Health: An Exploratory Study of Mental Health Training, Crisis 
Intervention Training, and Co-Response Models in the Canadian Context  
    
Informed Consent: The purpose of this research project is to survey all police services 
in Canada in order to construct a better understanding of mental health training, 
programs, and tactics (e.g., CITs/co-response teams) on a national scale, as well as to 
gather the best practices of commonly used training and programs by Canadian police 
services. You will be asked a series of basic questions on your service as well as the 
mental health training, programs, and tactics used at your service. The survey should take 
approximately 15-30 minutes to complete. Your participation in this survey is completely 
voluntary. If there are any questions that you do not want to answer, you can skip to the 
next question or you can exit the survey at any time. The survey is not anonymous, nor 
confidential as all answers provided will be associated with your police service. No 
personal information will be collected. The information you provide in this survey will be 
combined with other participant responses and used in a Master’s thesis, presentations, 
and publications.  
 
The risks involved in participating in this research project are minimal and similar to 
what you would expect to encounter in everyday life. If forwarded this survey by another 
individual (i.e., Information Officer), there is an increased risk of your survey responses 
being linked back to you. If completing this survey during work hours, ensure you have 
the appropriate permission to do so. Although there are no direct benefits to you for 
participation in this research, your completion of this survey will help researchers and 
other law enforcement agencies to better understand mental health policing in Canada. In 
addition, for completing the survey, I will donate $5 on your behalf to the Canadian 
Police Association Robert Warner Memorial Fund.      
 
Proceeding with this survey means that you have read the above and understand the 
nature of this study and agree to participate. You also understand that you have the right 
to refuse to participate and that your right to withdraw from participation at any time 
before or during the survey (up until the survey has been completed) will be respected 
with no coercion or prejudice.       
 
Participant Concerns and Reporting: If you have any questions concerning the 
research study or experience any discomfort related to the study, please contact the 
researcher, Christopher O'Connor, at 905-721-8668 ext. 5882 or 
Christopher.O'Connor@uoit.ca. Any questions regarding your rights as a participant, 
complaints or adverse events may be addressed to the UOIT Research Ethics Board 
through the Research Ethics Coordinator researchethics@uoit.ca or 905-721-8668 ext. 
3693.   
 
This study has been approved by the UOIT Research Ethics Board REB [REB# 14440] 
on June 22, 2017. 




 Letter of Endorsement:  
 
     
Consent to Participate:      
By consenting, you do not waive any rights to legal recourse in the event of research-
related harm.      
 
1. I have read the consent form and understand the study being described.      
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2. I have had an opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered. I am  
    free to ask questions about the study in the future.       
3. I freely consent to participate in the research study, understanding that I may  
   discontinue participation at any time without penalty. A copy of this consent form has   
   been made available to me.      
4. I understand that the information of this survey is going to be retained, and I consent to  
    its use in this study as well as future studies/analyses/presentations/publications.       
 
o I consent to participate  
o I do not consent to participate  
 
Skip To: End of Survey If  = I do not consent to participate 
 
 





2. Would you consider your police service to be in an urban or rural area? 
o Urban  
o Rural  




3. Approximately how many officers are employed at your police service? 
o 0 – 100  
o 101 – 200  
o 201 – 300  
o 301 – 400  
o 401 – 500  
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4. Are interactions with individuals with mental illness very common, somewhat   
    common, or rare for officers at your service? 
o Very common   
o Somewhat common  




5. How is mental health training administered to officers at your service (select all that  
    apply)? 
▢ Lectures  
▢ Seminars  
▢ Simulation/role play  
▢ Quizzing   
▢ Through other training (e.g. Use of Force) 





6. How many hours of mental health training do new recruits at your service receive  
    (either through the police college or through your service)? 
o 0 – 5  
o 6 – 7   
o 8 – 10  
o More than 10  
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7. How often do officers get re-trained on mental health? 
o Every 0 – 4 months  
o Every 5 – 8 months   
o Every 9 – 11 months  
o Every 1 – 2 years  
o Every 3 – 4 years  
o More than every 4 years  
o Officers do not get re-trained on mental health  
o Don’t know/information not available  
 
Skip To: 9 If 7 = Officers do not get re-trained on mental health 
Skip To: 9 If 7 = Don’t know/information not available 
 
 
8. How many hours of mental health training do officers at your service receive every 
    time they are re-trained? 
o 0 – 5 
o 6 – 7  
o 8 – 10  
o More than 10  




9. Do 911 operators at your service receive some form of training for mental health  
    related calls? 
o Yes  
o No  
o Don’t know/information not available  
 
Skip To: 11 If 9 = No 
Skip To: 11 If 9 = Don’t know/information not available 





10. For your 911 operators, what are they trained on with respect to mental health and  






11. In 2016, approximately how many mental health related interactions did your police  





12. In 2016, approximately how many mental health related interactions involved suicide  





13. In 2016, how many apprehensions under Provincial/Territorial mental health  





14. Does your service record any of the following information (select all that apply)? 
▢ Information on past encounters with individuals who suffer from mental  
illness or have had a mental health crisis  
▢ Outcomes of past encounters  
▢ Time officers spend at a crisis situation   
▢ Other (Please specify any other information you record with respect to  
mental health interactions): 
________________________________________________ 
▢ Don't know/information not available 
 
 




15. How do mental health crisis situations addressed by your officers most commonly   
      conclude? Please rank the following options from the most common conclusion to the  
      least common conclusion.  
______ Successful informal de-escalation (without arrest, without referral to mental  
 health service, and without transport to local hospital)  
______ Arrest 
______ Referral to mental health service  
______ Voluntary transport to local hospital/psychiatric facility 
______ Involuntary transport to local hospital/psychiatric facility 





16. With whom does your service have agreements/arrangements with to drop off  
individuals post-crisis (select all that apply)? 
▢ Hospital/psychiatric facility   
▢ Mental health services   
▢ There are no agreements/arrangements in place  





17. If an individual is transported to a local hospital/psychiatric facility, on average how  
long do your officers need to wait before the individual is transferred over to the staff 
at the facility? 
o 0 – 1 hour  
o 2 – 3 hours  
o 4 – 5 hours  
o More than 5 hours  
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18. To what extent do you agree that there are adequate mental health services available  
to people in your jurisdiction? 
o Strongly agree  
o Agree   
o Neither agree or disagree  
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree   
 
Skip To: 20 If 18 = Strongly agree 
Skip To: 20 If 18 = Agree 
 
 






20. If provided with an unlimited training budget, how could these funds be used to  
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21. How are mental health crises addressed at your service (select all that apply)? 
▢ Front-line officers  
▢ Designated mental health officers   
▢ Crisis Intervention Team (or a variation of) (A Crisis Intervention Team  
(CIT) is typically defined as a group of officers who receive an     
extended amount of mental health training (typically 40 hours) and  
are considered the “mental health crisis specialists” of their police  
service.)  
▢ A police-based co-response team (or a variation of) (A police-based co- 
                  response team is typically defined as a team response to a crisis   
situation by a police officer and a mental health professional (i.e.,  
nurse). The officer and mental health professional work together on 
shift and response to crises together at the request of first responding 
officers. Please note that this option does not include mental health-
based crisis teams originating out of hospitals.)  
▢ A mental health-based crisis team (or variation of) (A mental health- 
based crisis team is typically defined as a team response originating   
from a local hospital or mental health facility and can respond to   
crises at the request of first responding officers.)  
▢ Telephone consultation 
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22. If your service does not currently employ a CIT and/or police-based co-response  
team, are there plans to do so within: 
o The next 6 months  
o The next year  
o The next 5 years   
o More than 5 years  
o There are no current plans to employ a CIT/co-response team within the near  
future  
o Not applicable. My service does have a CIT and/or co-response team  
 
Skip To: 47 If 22 != Not applicable. My service does have a CIT and/or co-response team 
 
 












25. How many CIT/co-response teams does your service employ? Please specify an exact  







26. In 2016, how many mental health crisis related interactions did your CIT/co-response  









27. In 2016, approximately how many CIT/MCIT interactions involved suicide threats,  






28. In 2016, how many apprehensions under Provincial/Territorial mental health  








29. How many individuals are on your CIT/co-response team? (If your service employs  
more than one CIT/co-response, how many individuals are on each respective team) 
o 1 – 5  
o 6 – 10  
o 11- 15   
o 16- 20  
o More than 20  




30. Are officers assigned to your CIT/co-response team, or do they volunteer? 
o Assigned  
o Volunteer  
o Officers can be either assigned or volunteer  
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31. Is there a rotational period where officers may only serve on a CIT/co-response 
team for a select period of time?  
o Yes (why is the rotational period in place and how long is it?):   
________________________________________________ 
o No 










33. What roles/duties do your CIT/co-response team officer conduct while not addressing 






34. Is your CIT/co-response team solely utilized for mental health crises? Or is it used to   
      address other situations as well (e.g. individuals under the influence of drugs or   
      alcohol)? 
o Solely used for mental health crises  
o Can be used for other situations as well 




35. Is your CIT/co-response team partnered with a local hospital and/or mental health  
organizations? 
o Yes  
o No 
o Don’t know/information not available 
 
Skip To: 37 If 35 != Yes 











37. Does your CIT/co-response team refer individuals to mental health services, 
      programs, and hospitals/psychiatric facilities more regularly than non-CIT/non-co-   
      response officers? 
o Yes  
o No  
o Referrals are about the same for both sets of officers 




38. What percentage of crises handled by the CIT/co-response team are for individuals 
       that the CIT/co-response team has encountered in the past? 
o 0%  
o 1% – 10% 
o 11% – 20% 
o 21% – 30%  
o 31% – 40%  
o 41% – 50%  
o More than 50% 
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39. To what extent do you agree that the implementation of a CIT/co-response  
      team improves the safety of officers, the individuals involved, and bystanders of a  
      crisis situation? 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree 
o Neither agree or disagree  
o Disagree 




40. To what extent do you agree that the use of a CIT/co-response team positively   
      Improves police interactions with those in crisis? 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree 
o Neither agree or disagree 
o Disagree 




41. What are the differences in training provided to CIT/co-response officers at your  
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42. Is your CIT/co-response team the first response to crisis situations or do they get 
      requested to attend a crisis by first responding officers? 
o First response 
o Response is requested by first responding officers 
o Our CIT is a first response, but the co-response team is requested by first   
       responding officers 
o Don’t know/information not available  





43. Has implementing a CIT or co-response team resulted in less, more, or the same    
      amount of arrests of individuals with mental illness in your jurisdiction than non-   














45. In a few sentences, what is the overall objective or goal of your CIT/co-response 
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46. Is your service open to having an evaluation conducted on your CIT/co-response   
      team within the next 5 years? 
o Yes  
o No 




Would you be willing to participate in a confidential interview? The interview expands 
off this survey by allowing participants to freely discuss police mental health training 
with ensured confidentiality of responses which will not be associated with yourself or 
your police service. For participating in a confidential interview, I will donate an 
additional $10 on your behalf to the Canadian Police Association Robert Warner 
Memorial Fund. If you are interested, please provide your email and/or telephone number 







Thank you very much for taking time out of your busy day to complete this survey. Your 
responses are very helpful in attaining a fuller understanding of policing mental health in 
Canada. If you would like a copy of the final report on this research project, please leave 
an email in the box below and I will send you a copy once the study is complete. This 
email will in no way be connected to your responses.  If for some reason you change 
emails/jobs, feel free to send me your current contact info at any time or you may contact 
the principal investigator to obtain a copy of the final report. Thanks for all of your help 
and insights. It is very much appreciated. Please click the "next" arrow to exit the 
survey.   
o Email for final report ________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: SURVEY BLOCK 
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Appendix 6: Interview Invitation Email  
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Appendix 7: Interview Consent Form 
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Appendix 8: Interview Guide  
 
Before interview starts: Ask the participant whether they consent to the interview being 
recorded and go over the informed consent form including plans for transcription and the 
de-identification of this recorded data.   
 
Part I: Rapport Building 
1) Can you tell me a bit about yourself? (Probe: Current position? Current or 
previous experience with mental health policing? Previous Jobs? Education?) 
 
Part II: Mental Health Policing 
2) Are there any formal protocols or procedures in place for addressing mental 
health related interactions at your service? (Probe: How are possible mental 
health calls communicated from dispatchers to officers? What do officers do 
when they witness a crisis during their normal duties? In your experience, 
what are the different ways that a crisis situation can be resolved?) 
 
3) How are mental health crises typically resolved at your police service? (Probe: Is 
verbal/tactical de-escalation the first method of intervention? Is there a point 
in crisis de-escalation where verbal/tactical de-escalation is set aside in 
favour of use of force?) 
 
4) Have you heard of the term ‘psychiatrists in blue’? (Probe: How do you feel 
about the term? Is it an accurate label? Are interactions with individuals 
who have a mental illness or are in mental health crisis a common part of 
police work?) 
 
5) Is a Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) or a co-response team employed at your 
service? (“Yes” Probe: What sparked the implementation of the CIT/co-
response team?) (“No” Probe: What are the reasons contributing to no 
CIT/co-response team? Is it the choice of the service? Funding limitations? 
Etc.) 
(**If answer to #4 is “No,” skip to Part IV**) 
 
Part III: CIT/Co-Response 
6) What kind of mental health training do your CIT/co-response officers receive? 
(Probe: How long is training? How is training conducted [i.e. simulation]? 
How does their training affect mental health responses? What training works 
well and what should be altered? Is de-escalation more common among these 
officers?) 
 
7) What are some of the challenges your CIT/co-response team faces in your 
jurisdiction? (Probe: Lack of mental health services? Lack of an agreement 
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with a local hospital for intake? Encountering the same individuals? Is a 
position on the CIT/co-response team seen as ‘undesirable’?) 
 
8) What are some of the benefits of a CIT/co-response in your jurisdiction? (Probe: 
More positive interactions with individuals who have a mental illness? Are 
there less arrests and more diversions to services/hospitals?) 
 
9) Overall, what is the goal or objective or your CIT/co-response? (Probe: Is it to 
improve interactions with individuals who are in mental health crisis? Is it to 
improve public safety? To improve officer safety?) 
 
Part IV: Non-CIT/Co-Response Questions (**Part IV will only be asked in the event 
that a participant answers “No” to question #4**) 
 
10) What kind of mental health training do your officers receive? (Probe: How long 
is training? How is training conducted [i.e. simulation]? How does their 
training affect mental health responses? What training works well and what 
should be altered? Is de-escalation more common among officers with more 
training?) 
 
11) What are some of the challenges your officers face when interacting with people 
with mental illness or those in mental health crisis? (Probe: Lack of mental 
health services? Lack of an agreement with a local hospital for intake? 
Encountering the same individuals?) 
 
12) What are some of the benefits of training your officers on mental illness? (Probe: 
More positive interactions with individuals who have a mental illness or are 
in mental health crisis? Are there less arrests and more diversions to 
services/hospitals?) 
 
13) Overall, what is the goal or objective of mental health training at your service? 
(Probe: Is it to improve interactions with individuals who have a mental 
illness or are in mental health crisis? Is it to improve public safety? To 
improve officer safety?) 
 
Part V: Concluding Questions 
14) What are some of the main factors that may influence how a crisis situation gets 
resolved? (Probe: Do bystanders make responding officers feel as though they 
need to address the situation fast? Does violence or crisis escalation change 
how a crisis will conclude [e.g. Arrest vs. transfer to hospital]?) 
 
15) Generally, what are some of the challenges of mental health policing in Canada? 
What are some of the successes? (Probe: Differing mental health curriculums? 
Differing mental health legislation by province? Is an increasing 
collaboration with mental health services increasing successful interactions 
and mental health awareness?) 




16) What are some things that can be improved in terms of police mental health 
responses in Canada? (Probe: Better training? Establishing and improving 
community collaboration? Improving mental health services? Is there 
anything that your service can improve upon?) 
 
17) Do you have any questions for me or anything further to add that I missed? 
 
Part VI: Interview Thank You Message 
 
Finally, I’d like to thank you very much for participating in this research project. Your 
responses are very helpful in attaining a fuller understanding of policing mental health in 
Canada. If you would like a copy of the final report on this research project, please leave 
an email with me and I will send you a copy once the study is complete. This email will 
in no way be connected to your responses. If for some reason you change emails/jobs, 
feel free to send me your current contact info at any time or you contact the principal 
investigator to obtain a copy of the final report. 
 
Thanks for all of your help and insights. It is much appreciated.   
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Appendix 9: Canadian Police Association Memorial Fund Donation 
 
 
